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SECTION 1
CENERAL PROJECT INFORMATION
A. PURPC_E
This report is prepared in accordance with the requirements of Contract NASw-572,
"Research on Failure Free Systems", between the National Aeronautics and Space Adminis-
tration and the Westinghouse Electric Corporation (reference WGD-38521). The research
that is reported herein has the general objective of the advancement of the state-of-the-art
in the design of highly reliable electronic systems which can be expected to be associated
with the national space effort. The design objectives which are studied are those which permit
the proper operation of systems to be relatively insensitive to the effects of individual internal
component or subsystem failures.
The scope of this program has included the development of new techniques for organiz-
ing and implementing systems which more efficiently use redundant equipment to insure sys-
tem operation and the development of procedures for testing a variety of redundant systems.
The research performed during this program has been divided into four major task areas:
1. Statistical Measure of Quality
2. Implementation of an Adaptive Voter
3. Failure Responsive System Organizations
4. Medium Communication for Subsystem Reorganization
The four remaining sections and the Appendix of this report describe the work which
has been done in each of these major task areas. Because the details of the work in each of
these areas is relatively independent of the work in the other areas, each of the sections is
self contained and may be read as a separate report. The possible exception to this condi-
tion is Section 4 which contains extensive cross reference to the Appendix, a previously pub-
lished report describing earlier stages of work on the same task.
The remaining portions of Section 1 provide:
1. A brief summary of contents of each of the other sections including the Appendix.
2. The conclusions and recommendations drawn from each of the major task
efforts.
3. A list of the personnel directly contributing to the project.
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B. INDIVIDUALTASKSUMMARIES,CONCLUSIONS,ANDRECOMMENDATIONS
1. TaskI - StatisticalMeasureof Quality
Severalinvestigatorshaveshownthatthereliability of electronicsystemscanbe
greatlyincreasedthroughtheproperuseof "redundant"equipmentto providealternatesignal
paths. Otherinvestigators tudiedtheproblemof determiningtheoptimumintervalbetween
systemcheckout.Relativelylittle analyticalworkhasbeendonein thedevelopmentof proce-
duresfor estimatingsystemreliability basedonresultsobtainedfrom testingonlypartsof
thesystem.Similarly, little attentionhasbeengivento theallocationof testpointsamong
subsystemsof redundantnetworks ubjectto themissionrequirementsandthedecision
criteria ofthesystemuser.
Thetaskhasincludedthedevelopmentandanalyticalderivationof severaltech-
niquesfor performingtestpointallocationandsystemreliability estimationincorporatinga
broadrangeof systemparameters. Thesetechniquesareall formulatedin a mannerthat
permitstheusageof dynamicprogrammingtechniquesfor their solution. Commonto all
formulationsandthebasisfor thedevelopmentof solutions,are theexpressionsfor the
conditionalprobabilitiesof successbasedonthetimeof thetestandtest results. Thetech-
niquesandmethodologiesemployedin thederivationsdescribedin this report serveas illu-
minationtoanswerthequestionof whatto considerandhowonemightcombinethecritical
parametersassociatedwiththis typeof testing.
2. TaskII - Implementationof anAdaptiveVoter
Oneof themosteffectivepracticaltechniquesfor introducingredundancyinto
digital systemsis employedin multiple-linevotedsystems. In this configuration,asystem
is dividedintoagroupof identifiablesubsystems,whichare replicatedtwoor moretimes
andinterspersedwith redundantvotingcircuits. A typicalvotingcircuit examinestheset
of nominallyidenticalsignalsat its inputs,and,basedonthis inputinformationprovidesan
estimateofwhatthecorrectoutputsignalfrom thesubsystemsetshouldbe.
Themostcommonrestoringnetworkis a "majorityvoter". In orderto makea
correctestimateof theoutputfor a setof subsystems,themajorityvoterrequiresthatno
n+l. of its inputsbefailedto thesamestate. Althoughthis networkis effectivewhenn = 3,2
it is very inefficient when n 73. This ineffectiveness exists because the percentage of the
redundant subsystem which must be operating correctly to permit a correct vote is unde-
sirably large.
n is the number of inputs to the restoring network, i.e., the "order of redundancy".
I
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In orderto realizetheadvantagesof voterswhichcanoperatecorrectlywith less
thana majorityof correct inputs,someadaptionschemefor "deweighting"faultyinputsmust
beprovided. In studiesat StanfordResearchLaboratoriesandtheWestinghouseResearch
Laboratories,Dr. W.H. Piercehasdevisedseveralschemesfor optimallyweightinginputs
asafunctionof their pasthistoryof errors.
As partof this FailureFreeSystemstudy,Westinghousehasbeenattemptingto
bridgethegapbetweenPierce'stheoreticalstudiesandtheconstructionanduseof a practical
adaptivevoter. Inherentin thebasicdesignof anadaptivevoter is therequirementfor an
electricallyvariableconductance(orweight)devicewhichperformsintegrationanddisplays
relativelypermanentmemoryof theestablishedweight. Thesespecialcharacteristicshave
stimulatedconsiderableffort towardthedevelopmentof suitableadaptivecomponents.The
devicesof this typewhichhavebeenproposedgenerallyutilizephenomenainvolvingatomic
translationor rotation.
Duringthefirst phaseof this contract,anextensivesurveyof themorepromising
of thesedeviceswasmade.At thecompletionofthesurvey,andat thebeginningof thepres-
entphaseof thecontract,themercurycell integratorwithphotoelectricreadoutappeared
to offer themostattractiveapproachbecauseof its simplicity, stabilityin time andgeneral
compatibilitywithconventionalcircuitry. Becausetheoutputis essentiallyavariableresis-
tanceproportionalto theintegralof thecontrolinputcurrent, thedevicecanbeeasilyinter-
facedwithmorestandardcircuitry.
In concurrencewiththis finding,severalof themercurycell integratorswere
procuredfor evaluation.Theremainingeffort onthis taskhasbeenconcernedwiththede-
signandconstructionof anadaptivevoterwhichemployedthesedevicesinanoperational
model. Thespecificpurposein designingandconstructingthis modelwasto determinethe
actualusefulnessof suchdevicesin anadaptivevoterconfiguration.
Thebreadboardmodelof anadaptivevoterwhichhasbeenconstructedfor this
program, consistsofa hybridcombinationof analoganddigital circuitry andanon-line
generalpurposecomputer.Thecomputergeneratesimulatedinputdatafor thevoterand
performsthefeedbackadaptioncontrolfunctioninherento theoperationof thevoter.
In thefirst portionof thisdualrole, thecomputerhasbeenprogrammedto inject
intoa randomdatastreama varietyof differenterror patterns. By selectingtheproper
error patternthe investigatorhasthecapabilityto modifythestatisticalpropertiesof the
voter's inputdatato fit therequirementof almostanydesiredtest. Theuseof thecomputer
to performthefeedbackcontrolfunctionofferstheinvestigatoranadditionaldegreeof
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flexibility. To statistically test any proposed adaption scheme, a relatively simple subroutine
must be prepared for the computer and inserted into the existing main program. To perform
a test, the investigator needs only to supply the computer with the particular adaption sub-
routine to be considered and the information required to establish the simulated data charac-
teristics.
The portion of the voter which has been implemented as actual circuitry consists
of digital control equipment which increments the variabl_ inp::t weighting devices, the analog
weighting devices, and output threshold and squaring circuits. The entire voter operation is
described in Section 3.
3. Task III- Failure Responsive System Organizations
This task has been a continuation of the "Self-Repairing Systems" study which
began during the first year of this contract. It was shown in that study that systems which
have the capability to partially reorganize their redundant subsystems in response to existing
internal failure patterns may be more resistant to early life system failures than comparable
fixed redundant systems. The first goal of this study has been to develop design rules which
will make such systems practicable. The second goal has been to design a specific study
vehicle which can be used to demonstrate the feasibility of such systems.
The development of a set of design rules has been accomplished by comparing the
relative effectiveness of a wide variety of system organizations through the use of a computer
simulation program. The simulation program written for the previous phase of this study
was not considered to have adequate flexibility to accomplish the goals of the present program.
As a result, a new program has been written using many of the concepts of the original pro-
gram, but based primarily on a "spare list" technique for determining system reorganization
capability. This technique permits a much broader range of system parameters to be tested.
A detailed description of the program is presented in the Appendix. The following presents
a brief summary of the program operation.
A system organization to be simulated is represented in the computer by a three-
dimensional matrix with one dimension corresponding to the stages in the system, a second
dimension corresponding to the order of redundancy found within the system and a third di-
mension corresponding to the data words to be remembered about each individual subsystem.
In the new program the data words associated with each subsystem include a complete "spare
list". This list specifies the set of subsystems which can be sequentially called from the
rest of the system to replace each failed subsystem that becomes a part of a strategic pattern.
The data is read into the computer as a simple list of subsystem identification numbers.
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bUsing this listing method, almost any conceivable sequence of spares can be established by
simply modifying the "spare list" input data. This is in marked contrast to the reprogramming
previously required to generate new sequences.
In addition to the input "spare list" a number of other control variables are read
into the computer to simulate specific system organizations. These variables affect system
characteristics such as the capability of certain subsystems to perform multiple repairs, the
minimum amount of instantaneous failure masking required, and the relative reliability of
the subsystems and the peripheral switching circuitry.
The simulation study also has been extended to include orders of redundancy differ-
ent from order-three. This includes fractional and even orders of redundancy. As an ex-
ample of the results obtained from this portion of the study, it has been shown that three-and-
i_ _ 1 ¢',UII_d-II_Ltlorder* _a,,u,c_:'...._ responslvc systems _ nc_f_n+{_]],,"r'n,,r.h rnnr_ r_linh1_ than order-
_ L_v_ .... _j .....................
five multiple-line majority-voted systems.
The use of reorganizational strategies which employ a "pool" of spare subsystems
in an initially "off-line" operation has been avoided for a number of reasons. The most im-
portant reason is that no automatic checkout is provided for the spares in this pool, and, as
a result, spares which are already failed can be called into use. This system could allow
two failed subsystems to control the majority vote of a stage, thus inadvertently failing the
entire system.
Because the Mean Time Before Failure is not a particularly meaningful reliability
measure for redundant systems with relatively short but vital missions, a new measure was
adopted for comparing failure responsive systems. The measure is the time at which the
reliability of the systems falls below some predetermined level. For this study, the .90
level has been used.
A new criterion for evaluation has also been developed for this study which permits
a single value measure of effectiveness to be associated with each system organization under
test. Provisions have been made for incorporating the calculations required to determine
the value of this measure into the computer program. This facilitates a quick and relatively
accurate evaluation of system performance.
The remainder of the effort performed on this task has been oriented toward the
design of the study vehicle. The design rules developed through the use of the comparison
study described above have been used as a basis for the study vehicle design. The switching
A "three-and-one-half" order system is a system initially having half its stages order-
three and the other half order-four redundant.
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strategyincorporatedin thedesignis the"steplist" pattern. This is oneof thebetterstrate-
giesdevelopeduringthesimulationstudy. Three"spares"areprovidedfor eachstagein
thesystem,withall spareshavingexactlythesamemobility.
Afteranextensiveinvestigationit wasdecidedthatthetypeof systemwhichwould
bestdemonstratethefeasibilityof thefailureresponsetechniqueswouldbea specialpurpose
arithmeticunit.
Thespeci[icstudyvehiclewhichhasbeenselectedis thearithmeticsectionof a
beamsteeringcomputerusedin aphasedarray radar. Thisunit receivesdata,performs
anumberof arithmeticoperationsonthedata,temporarilystores,andthenreadsout the
results. Thearithmeticunit, whichmustprovideagivensequenceof operationsproperly
timedin relationto inputsandoutputs,plusstorageof intermediateresultsduringcomputa-
tion, waschosento taxboththereorganizationalstrategytheoriesandtheimplementation
techniqueswhichhavebeendeveloped.
Thebeamsteeringcomputerconsistsof four identicalsubsystems,eachconsisting
of twoadder-subtractors,twoshift registers, andonefull adder. Thecircuitry requiredto
implementasinglesubsystemconsistsof 33gatesand31flip-flops. Thesystemoperates
ona threephasecycle: inputdataread-in, arithmeticcomputationandstorage,andresults
output.
4. TaskIV - MediumCommunicationfor ModuleReorganization
In TaskIll of theFailureFreeSystems tudy,it hasbeenfoundthatsystemswhich
havethecapabilitytopartially reorganizetheconnectionpatternlinkingtheir individualsub-
systemshavesignificantlylongerusefullife spansthansystemswithafixedsubsystemcon-
figuration. Thereorganizationcapabilityallowsthesesystemsto avoidtheuseof failed
subsystemsandto maintainauniformdistributionof theoperatingredundantsubsystems.
Thetwoinherentprimarydifficultieswithsystemshavingthis capabilityare (1)theneedfor
relativelycomplexinterconnectionswitchingcircuitry and(2)theneedfor highlyhomgeneous
subsystems.
Anysysteminwhicheverysubsystemhasthecapabilityto communicatewith
everyothersystemis oftenreferredto asa "stronglyconnectedsystem". Systemsmaybe
stronglyconnectedthroughasystemof individualsignalchannelsuchaswires or througha
commonmediumsuchasa gas,a liquidor ablockof solidmaterial. Subsystemscommuni-
catingoverindividualsignalchannelsmayrequireasmanyasN2unidirectionalchannelsor
N2/2bidirectionalchannelswiththeassociatedchannelselectioncircuitry availableat least
at eachsubsystem.If, however,a mediumis usedas a centralmodethroughwhichall data
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passes, the characteristics of a strongly connected system are retained, but the number of
channels is reduced to 2N unidirectional channels or N bidirectional channels with all or most
of the channel selection circuitry confined to the medium.
A typical, although rather mundane, example of the economy of using a central
medium to contain the channel selection circuitry is the telephone system. In this case the
switchboard fills the role of a medium which performs all the channel selection functions for
the system. This example also illustrates that a large system might profitably be broken into
segments organized around individual media each of which communicates with the other media.
Although the question is academic at this point, the question of whether the individual media
should communicate directly or through a "higher rank" media is one which must be solved
before the very large, complex computing systems could be implemented.
This task has been concerned with the initial investigation of structures which can
easily be reorganized through the use of a medium communication channel. The investigation
has led to the formulation of a general type of computer organization which fulfills the objec-
tive of this task. As the formulation exists, the system function would be performed by a
group of subsystems communicating through a common medium. The medium also stores
any information which each subsystem would normally contain in any storage which was not
controlled by the inputs. Subsystem outputs are stored (and voted on) in the medium. The
channeling of the information would be accomplished either by tagging the data with some
time or frequency code, by providing an instruction program within each subsystem or by
providing a central controller which would be associated directly with the medium.
C. CONCLUSIONS
1. Task I - Statistical Measure of Quality
The objective of this task has been to develop a procedure for optimally allo-
cating test points to the subsystems in a redundant system subject to one or more limiting
criteria. This has been done for a particular system model.
If the assumption is made that the operation or failure of every stage is statistically
independent of the operation or failure of all subsystems outside the stage, the present
analysis technique may be extended to a fairly broad class of systems of predominantly
serial configurations. These systems may include feedback loops, feedforward loops, di-
verging branches and converging branches as described in great detail in Nemhauser's
work. If this assumption of independence cannot be made, a more sophisticated analysis
procedure must be used. It is recommended that future work in this area include the inves-
tigation of existing techniques of this latter type and the determination of the applicability of
the allocation procedure.
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Regardlessof theconfigurationof thesystemmodel,thetechniquedevelopedhere
canhandleanynumberof testpointsthatasingleunitmayrequire. Here, theimplicationis
thatthetotal numberof testpointsnecessaryto verify thesuccessor failure of a subsystem
begroupedasa "unit testpoint." Noallocationsof partialunittestpointsarepermitted.
If onlypartialsuccessor failure informationcanbeobtainedona unittheneachelementof
theE (V)expressionmustberederived. Theassumptionmustalsobemadethatthecost
functionsassociatedwithaddingtestpointswitllin thestagesmustbemonotonicallynon-
decreasing.
For mostpracticalsystems,thenumberof computationsrequiredto completethe
allocationprocedureis quitelarge. It is recommendedthatbeforesolutionof anyrealizable
systembeattempted,theentireallocationprocedure,includingageneralizedreliability
analysismethod,beimplementedasa computerprogramwhichis amenableto solutionona
largescaledigital computer.
2. TaskII - Implementationof AnAdaptiveVoter
Theresultsof thisprojecthaveshownthatadaptivevoterscanbeconstructed
usingmercurycell integratorsasthevariableinputweightingdevices. Theresultshave
alsoshownthatthe implementationof suchvotersusingvotingschemeswhichrequirecom-
putationof optimalweightvaluesrequirerelativelycomplexfeedbackadaptioncontrolloops.
This last requirement,combinedwith theproblemsinvolvedinusingthepresentlyavailable
modelsof themercurycell integrators,leadstotheconclusionthatadaptivevotersof this
typearepresentlyanimpracticalmeansof improvingthereliability of redundantsystems.
Despitethisrathernegativeconclusion,thepotentialimprovementin systemre-
liability offeredbytheuseof adaptivevoterscannotbeignored. In orderto advancetheart
towardtherealizationof practicaladaptivevotingtechniques,thefollowingrecommendations
for futureworkin thisareaaremade:
a. Thesearchfor suitableweightingdevicesshouldbeactivelycontinued,and
considerationshouldbegivento makingphysicalchangesin themercurycell
integratorsto eliminatesomeof thepresentproblems.
b. A broadrangeof adaptionschemesincludingthoseproposedbyPierceshould
beexaminedona comparativebasis. Theobjectivein performingthis com-
parisonwouldbeto determinethecost, in terms of lost reliability, of using
simple,easyto implementschemesrather thanthemoresophisticated
"optimal"adaptionschemes. Althoughmanyadaptionschemesarenot
amenableto mathematicalanalysis,thecomparisonwouldbe relativelyeasy
1-8
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to perform through the use of a computer simulation program similar to the
one used in the present project. In this case, however, the entire voter would
be simulated rather than just the feedback adaption control loop.
c. Using the results of the comparison study recommended above,and if suitable
weighting devices are available which have the characteristics required by the
particular adaption schemes under consideration, complete breadboard models
of the more promising schemes should be constructed and tested.
3. Task III- Failure Responsive System Organizations
Using the computer simulation program prepared for this task, an extensive series
of tests were made to determine the most effective switching patterns which could be used
in the fabrication of failure r_sponsive systems.
The results of these tests show that the members of one particular class of response
strategies are the most efficient of all the well-ordered strategies which were tested. The
observance of this characteristic and the recognition of the value of "rescan" capability leads
to the following general conclusions:
1. The capability of individual subsystems to move to new locations should be as
evenly distributed among the subsystems as possible.
2. The subsystems which are available for use as spares (or replacements) to any
two stages should be chosen so that the mutual dependence by these stages on
the same spares is minimized.
3. The systems should be so organized that, in normal circumstances, a subsys-
tem will not move to the aid of a critically failed stage if its movement will
leave the stage in which it is presently operating vulnerable to a single failure.
A critically failed stage should have the "authority", however, to demand the
movement of a spare subsystem ifthe movement of all of the spare subsystems
available to this stage are restricted as above.
It can also be concluded from the test results, that order-two-and-one-half re-
dundant failure responsive systems may effectively replace order-three redundant multiple-
line systems in applications where instantaneous failure masking is not important. Con-
versely, applications with either high instantaneous failure masking or exceptionally long
liferequirements may be benefitted by employing order-three-and-one-half or order-four re-
dundant failure responsive systems to replace order-three, or even order-five, multiple-
line systems.
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From other results obtained in the study, it may be concluded that the beneficial
effects obtained from failure responsive capability appear to more than offset the disad-
vantages inherent in the relatively complicated circuitry required for system implementation.
These curves show that the useful lives of the example systems have been significantly in-
creased over those of the corresponding examples of multiple-line systems. These increases
have been realized despite relatively pessimistic assumptions regarding the reliability of the
error detection and switching circuitry.
Finally, it may be concluded that the optimum number of spare subsystems which
should be made available to any stage is a function of the failure rate of the peripheral cir-
cuitry relative to the failure rate of the subsystems. It can be seen from the results of the
study that for systems having relatively simple subsystems the optimum number of available
spare subsystems per stage will be around three to five.
The design of a practicable system having failure responsive capability has been
accomplished. This design has shown that such systems can be implemented using standard
combinational logic circuits to form the various error detection, error correction and
"repair" switching functions which are required.
Although the amount of peripheral circuitry required to implement the functions
mentioned above does not seem excessive, it may be concluded that the subsystems must be
at least as complex as those described for the beam-steering computer considered here.
The successful design of this particular study vehicle demonstrates the applicability of failure
responsive system techniques to systems containing input-controlled memory. In addition,
the design has shown that subsystem with multiple inputs can be handled with the reorganiza-
tional capability of these systems.
The present design of the study vehicle contains no specific provisions to protect
the system against all failure modes of the peripheral circuitry. In many cases, failures in
this circuitry will be treated as subsystem failures. The natural extention of this work
would be to continue the design effort to provide protection against all peripheral circuit
failure modes.
The existing computer simulation program does not provide for the simulation of
failures in redundant peripheral circuitry or in peripheral circuitry which affects the opera-
tion of more than one subsystem. It is recommended that the program be modified to include
this simulation capability.
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Q 4. Task IV - Medium Communication for Module Reorganization
The results of this exploratory investigation have led to the conclusion that the
system structures employing a medium communications channel offer the following potential
advantages to users of ultra-reliable computing systems.
a. High Subsystem Mobility
1. The prime advantage is that this type system offers one means for realizing
the potential benefits of failure-responsive systems. Indeed, in the system where each sub-
system can perform all the functions,the maximum "mobility" of the subsystems has been
achieved because every subsystem may replace any other subsystem as the failure pattern
occurs. In this system two of the main restrictions on mobility have been removed. The
first restriction is that all subsystems perform the same function. Subsystems are proposed
which have the capability to change function when they change position. As a result the
homogeneity difficulties inherent in fixed function subsystems do not arise. The second
major obstacle to mobility occurs when a subsystem contains a fixed memory - i.e. a
memory not set up within a few cycles by the data stream. Subsystems which are otherwise
identical but which contain different information in their memory are not interchangeable.
However, using a memory medium, memory which was formerly a part of the subsystem is
now a part of the medium. Any subsystem may now associate itself with the part of the
medium containing this memory and perform in this position just as well as any other sub-
system.
2. Graceful Degradation
Graceful degradation of the system performance is inherently available in
the system. This concept of graceful degradation assumes that the system is not used for
only one purpose at a fixed data rate. In that case, a fixed computational capacity would be
required. To have greater capability would be wasteful, and to have less capability would
constitute complete failure.
The system proposed has this desirable property. For example, the sys-
tem may first have twenty subsystems. If each subsystem is identical - can accomplish all
the functions, then eighteen subsystems can fail (assuming two out of three voting) and the
computer will still be able to do everything that was possible initially, but take ten times as
long to do the same task.
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3. Optimal Non-Redundant Operation
One of the most common objections to redundant systems is that they use
three times the number of components without increasing computer capability. On the other
hand, itmay be desirable to operate three computers in parallel when failure is very expen-
sive. As these two operational modes imply, having three individual computers gives one a
choice between capability and reliability. This choice is available in an even more useful
form ,:-iththe medium system. By reprogramming the system the subsystems may do each
process only once, increasing the power of the computer by a factor of two or three. This
option may be very desirable for ground testing equipment before take off, or in any mode
where reliability is not as important as speed.
Operation in the non-redundant mode is not alien to the system design and
interweaving non-redundant and redundant operation is quite possible. This may be done even
in the same computation if certain parts are not as significant as others.
4. Asynchronous Operation of Subsystems
The units in a processing system with memory may operate asynchronously.
This autonomy relieves the programmer of timing problems and increases the efficiency of
computation since subsystems need not wait for each other. As this condition implies, -the
memory serves both as a central medium and as a buffer store for each subsystem.
5. Efficient Use of Time Shared Subsystems
Because the subsystems are not restricted to a single functional location,
but rather perform the next in a sequence of functions as they are needed, the subsystems
may be shared between different problems. Priority interrupt is effected by placing the
interrupting routine within the main program. The subsystems operate in parallel; hence,
each subsystem is used to its full capacity.
A new development program such as this creates many new study areas. One ap-
proach to developing the organization in more detail would be to assume some properties for
the subsystems and then write the programs to make them function as desired. This configu-
ration could then be simulated on a general purpose digital computer. Such a procedure
would insure that realistic solutions are found in each problem area.
The basic concept of a system implementation which employs a memory medium
as a communication linkage between subsystems has been formulated. The investigators
strongly recommend that this study be continued. The objectives of continuing this task
should be the further development of a medium communication system implementation.
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The next step toward reaching this objective should be accomplished by seeking answers to
the following questions:
a. What type of voters should accompany a system of this type?
b. How many of the voters should be provided in relation to the number of func-
tions being performed by the system, the operating speed of the voters, the
data rate of the system, etc.
c. Should the system program be stored in the medium or in the subsystems ?
d. Are there reasonable alternatives to the "drum" medium?
e. What "tag" information should accompany all data words stored in the medium?
---_-- _,-_,,,_ ,ho 4_t_ h_ stored in the medium?f. In what pattern oz- u_,_ o ,,, .............
g. How many different functions should each subsystem be capable of performing?
h. How complex should the functions be?
D. PROJECT TEAM
This contract effort has been performed by the Advanced Development Subdivision of the
Surface Division of the Westinghouse Electric Corporation. The effort has been one part of
a broad program conducted by this subdivision in the development of techniques for constructing
ultra-reliable electronic systems.
Mr. Sidney E. Lomax, Director of Development, has been responsible for the manage-
ment of this contract since the inception in 1963. Mr. C.G. Masters, Jr., as project engi-
neer, has been responsible for the technical direction of all tasks performed under the project.
The performance of the individual tasks have been the responsibility of the following engineers.
Task I. - William A. Lutts
Task II. - James E. Thompson
Task III. - Joseph M. Hannigan
Charles G. Masters, Jr.
Task IV. - Kevin P. Shambrook
In addition to this principle team, several other engineers from the Advanced Development
Subdivision have supported the individual task efforts in various specialized roles.
Henry F. DeFrancesco Karl C. Wehr
Faris J. Kahwajy Thomas A. Woolverton
William C. Mann
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SECTION 2
STATISTICAL MEASURE OF QUALITY
2-1 INTRODUCTION
The steadily increasing sophistication of space missions has been reflected in an in-
creased complexity of spaceborne electronic data processing and control systems. This
increase in complexity tends to lower the reliability of systems which normally operate in an
environment where the cost of system failure is extremely high. In many cases, this cost
may include the loss of human life in addition to the loss of a space vehicle and an aborted
mission.
Several teams of investigators have shown that the reliability of electronic systems can
be greatly increased through the proper use of "redundant" equipment to provide alternate
signal paths. By far the largest portion of work that has been done concerning the use of
redundant equipment has been concentrated on the development of synthesis techniques and
procedures for analyzing the initial reliability of systems implemented in a redundant config-
uration. Relatively littlework has been done in the development of procedures for testing
redundant systems and for estimating their reliability after they have been fabricated and
released to the user.
The user of spaceborne electronic equipment has three different situations in which he
may wish to test the equipment. The first situation exists when the equipment is being
examined in a shop environment prior to being mounted in the space vehicle. In this situation,
time is usually not of essence and exhaustive testing is desirable to the limit permitted by the
physical design of the equipment. The second situation exists when the equipment has been
mounted in the vehicle, and a test is to be made prior to launch. In this case, time is of the
essence and an exhaustive test of an entire redundant network would usually be prohibitive.
The third situation exists during long term, multi-phase space missions where tests are made
at several preplanned intervals to determine which of a possible set of alternatives should be
followed either during the next immediate phase or the remainder of the mission. In most
cases the decision to be made is simply whether to continue or terminate the mission depend-
ing on the probability of successfully completing the next phase. In this case, both time of
test and the complexity of test equipment are of vital interest.
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In the latter two situations, there exists an obvious need for a technique to facilitate
making an accurate estimate of the probability of successfully completing the mission based
on information gained from testing only part of the system before or during the mission. A
similar need often exists in the shop situation because the use of tightly packaged microminia-
ture circuitry may severely limit the amount of individual subsystem testing which can be
performed. This is true regardless of the time permitted for the test or the availability of
_UIJIIJ._LI_t_U [_S[ equipment.
In answer to the questions of what portion of the equipment should be tested and how
should the partial test results be utilized to obtain an estimate of the probability of mission
success, an analysis has been made of one idealized system. (See figure 2-1.) This system
was analyzed to determine the probability of mission success both without any testing and with
only partial testing. These results were then used as a basis for developing procedures that
might be utilized for optimally allocating a limited number of test points within a redundant
system. In this case, an optimum allocation is one which provides more information concern-
ing the operational states of the system than any other test point allocation having either the
same number of test points and/or the same total cost of the test points. Thus, the problem
of test point allocation may be limited by one or several constraints on the quantity of test
points to be some number less than or equal to some fixed limit L T and/or the total cost of
placing the test points to be less than or equal to some fixed limit C T.
2-2 DEFINITIONS
Several terms which are utilized in the discussion must be defined:
Unit. The smallest independently operating block of equipment in a stage.
Stage. A set of identical units connected in parallel in such a manner that each
unit's operation or failure is independent of that of the others in the stage.
System. A set of series connected stages where each stage is isolated from failures
of every other stage.
Unit Successful State.
was designed.
Unit Failed State.
it was designed.
Stage Successful State.
ful states.
A unit is capable of and operates in the manner for which it
Unit does not have the capability to operate in a manner for which
A stage which has at least k. out of n. units in unit success-
] )
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NODE A C)--
I m
-SS-
kl k m
J
kj
----ONODE B
n. : number of units in stage j
J
k. = least number of units required for stage it to be in a successful state.]
pj(t) = probability of success for a unit in stage j at any time t.
qj(t) = probability of failure for a unit in stage j at any time t.
pj(t) + qj(t) = I
j = l, 2, - ...... m
m
n=y. n.
j:l J
Figure 2-1. Idealized System Model
Stage Failed State. A stage which has less than k. units in unit successful states.
]
System Successful State. Each stage j out of m total stages has at least k. out of
]
nj units in unit successful states simultaneously.
System Failed State. At least one stage j out of m total stages has less than k.
]
units inunit successful state.
Reliability. The probability of continuous successful operation over a specified
period of time.
Unit Test Point. An item of equipment which determines the existence of the suc-
cessful or failed state of a unit.
Unit Test Point Cost. The total dollar cost of obtaining the information on the suc-
cessful or failed state of a unit.
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2- 3 PROBLEM FORMULATION
A block diagram of the system model under consideration is the one shown in figure 1.
This system has a total of (m) stages and (n) individual units. Signals enter at node A and
are processed in parallel by the units of each stage. The resultant output leaves the system
at node B. The specific values of nj, kj and pj(t) at each stage j are allowed to be different
for all stages. All failure modes of each unit will be assumed to have no effects on the status
of the other units in the system. This means that the failure of a unit within a stage has no
effect on the failure rate of other units within that stage and that the stages are independent
of one another. The significant points to be made about this configuration are as follows:
1. Generality is preserved to the extent that nj, the number of subsystems in
stage j, and kj, the minimum number of subsystems required for success, are
allowed to vary from stage to stage.
2. The function pj(t) for the probability of unit success is allowed to vary from
stage to stage.
3. All stages must be operating for the system to operate. This is an active
redundant system. Each unit operates continuously at each stage until that unit
enters a failed state.
A. Fixed Configuration Without Testing
The analysis problem is to determine the reliability expression for a fixed configuration
such as that described above. For this configuration nj, kj, n, m and pj(t) are given. In the
development of this reliability expression certain characteristics of the system should be
noted.
1.
2.
For any unit there are two possible states, successful or failed. For a total of
2nn units there are possible states that the system might assume at any point
in time given that this system is allowed to operate until all units fail.
n.
] n.
In any one stage there are 7. (k ]) possible successful states. Since the sum-
k=k.
] .th
mation represents the total number of ways of having success in j stage, the
n.
m j n.
total number of ways of having system success becomes I-[ 7- (k]) •
j=l k=k. ]
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3, From 2 above and the fact that for each stage all n. units are identical, there
]
are (nj - k.l + 1) distinguishable stage successful states. For the system then,
m
there are I-[ (nj - k. + 1) possible system successful states which are dis-j=l J
tinguishable.
4, Letting Ps.(t) be the probability of stage success, then for any stage j the
J
expression is a simple form of the binomial:
n. n.-k
] nj k ]Ps (t) = E (k) p (t) qj (t)j k=k.
J
n.
n.-k
= F. p, (t) 1-p_ (t)
k=k
J
n. nj [ Pj(t) ]Ps(t)= [1-pj(t)] E] (k)j k=k. ['1 : P-jj(t)
]
B°
5. For the entire system then the reliability expression for any point in time is:
m n. nj
Ps(t) : I'[j:l Psj(t) : ]'l'j:l (1 - pj (t)) ] k=k.j (k) 1 -V0J
]
It should be noted here that this expression holds at any time t given that no
tests are conducted after some reference time t .
O
Fixed Configuration With Testing
For the problem of conducting a test at some point in time t 1 and utilizing the results
to determine the probability of mission success at some future time t m > tl, the expression
for Ps(t) is different. The test of the system is such that two general questions must be
answered:
1. Is the system in any one of the system successful states ?
2. Which units out of those tested are in a successful state and which are in a
failed state ?
If the answer to the first question is no, then the probability of mission success is
zero. If the answer is yes, the user employs the results of the second question to make a
better estimate of mission success.
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Let:
sj = the total number of units operating out of _.j in stage j at some test time t 1.
_. = total number of test points in stage j.
J
z. = the exact number of units out of n. -_ that are operating at some point in time
J ] J
t 1 •
s = the exact number of units out of sj that are operating at time t m.
Depending on the relative values of nj-%, s.j and kj, the new estimate of the probability
of mission success of a stage based on the test results may be divided into three general
cases.
For notational convenience the following convention will be utilized to represent the bino-
mial for any set of variables r, i and values of t.
PJ (t k _ tu ) = p! _ r-ij (t k t u) qj (t k - tu)
Case I s. = 0 The number of units with test points that are successfully operating in stage
J
j at (tl) is zero.
Let:
(i)
(2)
If n.j - _.] < kj, the new probability of mission success Ps. = 0 since the number
J
of units operating in the stage j is less than the minimum required k..
]
Ifn. -}. > kj, the value ofl _ tt m)_ depends on the value of z. wherez. =] j s j ]
kj, k. + 1 ............ n. - _. From the results of a test, it is known thatJ J ]
s. = 0 and that the system is operating. This latter information implies that
3
the successful units are of the set n. - }. and the value of z. is indeed greater
] J J
than or equal to k..
J
K = The condition exists that k.j_< z.j_< (nj-}j)
k = the number of units that survive until t
m
Then
s. (tm)
J
n.-_.
] J
z. =k.
J J
P (zj/K) P (kj
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Case II
where
P(kj
P(zj/K)
Z°
j zj ,
_< k <- zj) = _ (k)pj (tm-tl)
k=k.
]
n.-_. ,
J I p.
z. J _tl - to)
]
= n.-_. n.-l.
___Zk.(1 J J_ 1)Pj (tI - to)
J
Combining:
njj _j
Z
zj=kj
Z.
J Z. *t. . ,,]
zj k=k.
J
nj-,_j nj- _j ,
Y. ( _ ) Pj (tl-t O)
_=k.
]
0 < s. < k. The number of units with test points that are successfully operating in] J
stage j is less than k. and greater than zero.
J
(1) If n.-_. = 0, the new probability of mission success Ps(tm) = 0 since all n. unitsJ J ]
have test points and the number operating at tl, namely si, is less than the
minimum required k..
J
(2) If (nj-_j+sj) < kj, the new probability of mission success P's(tm)_ = 0 since the
total of s. +z.< k..
] J ]
(3) If 0<(nj-lij)<kj and (nj-_j+sj)>kj, then there is at least one combination
(s + zj)->kj at time t 1. In this case we are given that the answer to question
two for stage j is that there are s. units in successful states and _.-s. in unit
] ] ]
failed states. Since it is known exactly which s. units are operating, the pro-]
bability that the s. units are operating, the probability that the s. units survived
J ]
until t 1 at t 1 is one. Thus, the user of the test results knows that there must
be at least k.-s. units operating out of the n.-i/, because of the result of question
_] J J l
one.
Since n.-_j j < kj, the minimum number of units from the set si,_ that are required
to operate for the period tm-t 1 given that all n.-l. are operating for that sameJ ]
period, is s = kj-(nj-ij). Thus, the lower limit on Jz_becomes z. = k.-s for any] ]
s in the range kj-(nj-_j) < s < s_.j . In this case, the range of z. becomes
k.-s<z.<_n.-_.. ]
J J J J
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FormulatingtheprobabilityP's.(tin) for this setof circumstancesyields:]
sj sj n.-1. n -_ z.
• j j . • j zj ,[( ] J)Pj (tl-t O)Z (k)Pj(tm-tl)]]]
Z [(s ) Pj (tm-tl) [z.=k.-s z.] k:k.-s
s=kj-(nj-lj) J ] j
P', (tm)= n.-lj n-Isj j . . •
V t ] ]_ D I+ _+
"" _ _ '_j_'l "0'
l=k.- s.
] ]
Case III
(4) If nj-_j>-kj, there is at least one combination s+z.>-k.j ] at time t 1 which
satisfies the successful operation criterion. In this case we are given that
there are s. units in successful states and L-s. in unit failed states. In
J J J
this case the minimum number of units from the si, that are required to
J
operate for the period tm-tl, given that at least k of the n.-_. are in unitm ] J
successful states, is zero.
Incorporating this into the expression for (3) above yields:
S.
S.
=0[J (s J) p*j (tm-tl)
Ps. (tm) = n.-l.
] ] ] n.-_. .
Z ( J J) Pjl=k.-s. _ (tl-tO)
J ]
n.-_. z.
] ] n.-_. j z.
y. [(1 l)p:(t,-t,,)_ (,))P_ (tm-tI)]]
z. J J" Uk k s '_z. =k.-s ] = .-
J ] ]
s. > k. The number of units with test points that are successfully operating in stage
] J
j is greater than or equal to k..]
(1) If nj-_j =0, the number of units required for success, s + z.] > kj, will reduce
to s > kj, thus, the expression for P's.(tm) becomes
]
S.
] s. ,
Ps.(tm ) = Z (s J) pj (tm-t 11
J s=k. ]
(2) If nj-_j<kj, there is at least one combination s + z.] > k.] at the time t 1 which
satisfies the successful operation criterion. In this case the user knows that
there are _j units thatare successful but knows nothing about the other nj-jgj. The
ranges for s and z. in the expression for Ps.(tm) then depend on the condition
] ]
of the n.-Q. units. Since z. can have the range 0 < z. < nj - _j, then s must rangeJ ] J ]
2-8
from k_j - (nj - _j) <_.s < s.. For thedeterminationof P" ..(tm), the lowerJ s.
J
limit on z. will become z. = k. - s thus reflecting the dependence of stage suc -] ] J
cess on z.. Combining the above results yields the same expression forJ
Ps. (tm) as that found in Case II(3).
]
(3) If n. - _. > kj, again, there is at least one combination s + z. > k. at time t 1J J J J
which satisfies the successful operation criterion. In this case the user knows
that there are s. units successful but still knows nothing about the other n. - 4.,
J J J
However all the comments from (2) above hold with the exception that the
quantity kj-(nj-lj) will be less than or equal to zero) thus allowing s to take on
all values from 0 through s., Therefore the expression for P_ (t) is the same
as that found in Case II(4). ]
In summary, the following table represents the ranges of the indices s and z for all the
p"
above cases whieh yield an ..(tm)*O.S.
]
S. =0
J
0<s. < k.
] }.
z=O
O<n.-_l.< k.
J ] J
kj=(nj-_j)< s<_sj
k.-s<z.<n.-L
J J J J
kj-(nj-ij)< s<sj
k.-sSz.< n.-].
] J J J
s=0
k._<z.<n.-_.
J J J J
0<s<s.
J
k. = s_<z.<_n. - _.
J J ] J
0<s<s.
l
k.- s<_.z._<n.-_.
J J J J
Table 1
Taking table 1, the general expression for Ps(tm) for all m stages may be written as
follows:
s. n.-_. . nj-"_j z.j s. , JZ J , j z. ,)-:" [(s J) Pj (tm-tl)[ [( s )Pj(tl-tO) _ (k J) Pj(tm-tl)]]]
z.=k.-s k=k.-s
s=kj-(nj =_j) J J Jm
Ps(tm) = l=I
j--1
n.-_.j j n.-_. $
( 1£ J)pj (tl_tO)
_=k.-s.
J J
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2.4 TEST POINT ALLOCATION
In the previous sections, definitions have been stated and the system reliability esti-
mates have been developed for configurations with and without test results. However, the
allocation of test points and the reasoning behind their placement has not been answered. In
the placement of any single test point, due consideration must be given to the "value" of
locating itwith any specific ,_,nit.
A. Value Function
For any decision to locate a single test point, the ultimate gain to the user of the test
results is the incremental change in the estimate of system reliability. This ultimate payoff
will be considered as a meaningful and quantifiable measure of test point value.
LetA Ps.(]j) represent the incremental change in the estimate of system reliability re-
J
sulting from the addition of each test point to stage J. One of the following three results may
occur:
1. A Psj(_j)= 0
2. A ps.(_j) >0
]
3. a Ps.(_j) < o
]
For one, a zero value results since the only conclusion the user can draw is that his system
is following the predicted curve determined at t and all decisions made about the system at
o
t need not be changed. For either two or three, the resulting difference may cause the user
o
to deviate from his initial set of decisions depending on the magnitude and sign of APs.. (To
]
speculate on what magnitude and sign of APs. should cause a change in an initial decision at
J
t depends on some predetermined set of intervals of values of AP and the set of alternative
O S.
J
courses of action associated with each band. Since it is not the purpose of this study to
establish these intervals or the courses of action, neither will be mentioned any further.) A
non-zero value results in either two or three above and is determined by the configuration of
test points and the ultimate benefit of allowing the system user to make better mission deci-
sions.
Since it is the existence of a difference and not the sign of the difference that yields a
value, the value of any stage j will be defined as V. = IA Ps (_j) Ifor, any allocation of (_j) testJ ]
points in that stage.
2-10
The objective of this program is to find an allocation of test points for the entire sys-
tem; therefore, the problem of combining the stage values into some meaningful objective
function which reflects the system operations still remains. Prior to to, the parameters of
V. are all determined. For t >_ to, all previously fixed parameters remain fixed and a newJ
parameter s_.jenters Vj. This parameter then determines the value V. at some point in timeJ
t 1. However, the quantity sj is probabilistic in nature and directly depends upon the success
or failure of the units with test points. Thus, a more reasonable estimate of the value V. of
J
any test point allocation would be the increase in the expected value of V.. For any stage J,
J
the new stage value function is:
V.
= t,tl-tO)] s.=0 j j
J
Keeping consistent with the previous development of V. and utilizing the assumption that all
J
m stages are independent, a reasonable system value function is:
m
E(v) = Z v
j=l J
B. Characteristics of E(V)
The basis for utilizing E(V) in the following development is the guarantee that one may
restrict attention to dominate configuration for matrices. This states that as later stages are
added, there is no previously rejected combination of earlier stages with an allocated set of
test points that might somehow fit better with new ones. The interpretation of what exactly is
meant by a dominate configuration will be developed as various decision models are formu-
lated. The remainder of this report primarily describes the formulation of a set of decision
models which might be utilized in deciding where test points should be allocated in an optimum
manner.
Since the function E(V) is the objective function for all but one of the following problem
statements, it is worthwhile to describe some of its characteristics.
1. If E(V1) and E(V2) are the expected values for two disjoint sets of stages, then
they combine to form a larger set whose expected value E[V(E(V1) , E(V2))] is
uniquely determined.
2. E(V) is monotone increasing in the sense thatE(V 1) > E(V 1) and E(V 2) > E(V2)
implies E[V(E(V1) , E(V2))] > E[V(E(V1) , E(V2))] for all expected values E(V1),
s
E(V2), E(V1), (E(V2).
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Thestatementsandcharacteristicsstatedthusfar establishtheframeworkfor theapplica-
tionof dynamicprogrammingtechniquesto thesolutionof theallocationalternativesdescribed
below.
C. DecisionModels
As impliedpreviously,thegoalof a testprogramis thedevelopmentof (1)a testpro-
cedurewhichwill providethemostsuccess-failurestateinformationfor somepredetermined
constraintondollar costor, conversely;(2)afixedamountof thesameinformationfor mini-
maldollar costs. Inherentobothof theseproblemsis theconceptof partial systemtesting
tobecarriedoutwithsomeconstraintonthequantityof testpointsto beutilizedin thesys-
tem.
For oneabove,casesI throughIV, whichfollow, describefourpossibleconstraintson
costwiththreevariationsonthequantityof testpointsavailablefor eachcostconstraints.
For twoabove,acaseV will bedevelopedwhichis verysimilar to onedevelopedbyKettle(1).
Let:
CL = the total cost for allocating L test points in the system
CT = Constraint on available dollar cost for any allocation of test points in the sys-
tem
Case I
cj, ck = Unit test point cost for a single unit in any arbitrary stages j or k.
Max (cj(nj-1)
m m
+ k___l Cknk < C T < j=l
k_j
c.n,
JJ
This case is equivalent to the decision model of allocating a quantity of test points to a
system with no constraint on dollar cost. The amount C T specified allows for any complete
allocation of the maximum of n-1 test points allowed under the partial testing criteria previous-
ly described. Under this case, any one of the following three conditions could exist:
1. Maximize E (V)
subject to:
m
j=l ]
._<n. for all j
J J
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g'
n
For this problem, there are (L) feasible solutions which could yield the maxi-
mum E (V). Further observation of E (V) reveals that in any one stage for any k there are
n.
(k ]) k = 0, 1, .... nj, arrangements of test points which yield the same value Vj. Utilizing
the fact that L may vary from one to n-1 and the results of the previous observation, the range
for search for a maximum E(V) is limited between a minimum of two and maximum of (nj + 1)
terms per stage. Two terms occur when the number of test points L is equal to (n-l) and
(nj + 1) terms occur whenever L is less than the quantity (n-min.imumJ nj).
With the above results, the dynamic programming techniques in Nemhauser (2)
and several other tests may be utilized to find the optimum value of E(V) for any fixed L.
For a given group of test point allocations, defined over a set of stages, a
configuration is said to dominate another ff it yields a larger E(V) for any other allocation of
the same quantity of test points.
2. Maximize E(V)
subject to:
m
_. _.<L
j=l J
where _. < n. for all j
] J
In developing the answer for fixed L above, one also has the ability to obtain a
much broader and possibly more meaningful set of results as expressed in the inequality con-
straint on L. In this case, a decision may be made based on the results of maximizing
for each value of l (1 -< _ < L) and observing a plot similar to that found in figure 2-2.
This technique is much more laborious than (1) but is the straight forward
dynamic programming approach with the total number of terms per stage being n. + 1 for the
J
maximum value of L equal to n-1.
3. Maximize E(V)
subject to: L variable
J_j <nj
Introducing the constraint of L variable is the same as stating that the only
sure decision is that the total number of test points to be allocated is some number less than
or equal to n-1. Therefore all discussion of (2) above applies in this instance.
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Figure 2-2. Maximum E(V) Vs Quantity of Test Point
Case II CT Fixed
The total cost C L of the allocation of test points is approximately equal to or exactly
equal to some fixed limit C T. Because the information gained from a test is a monotonically
non-decreasing function of the number of test points, the allocation which yields the maximum
E(V) will be as close to the value C T as possible without exceeding it. The necessity for
specifying C L relative to C T is caused by the fact that the C. are allowed to be different]
between stages. There is no before the fact method of specifying that C L will exactly equal
C T since the final configuration of test points has not yet been determined. Depending on the
constraints placed on L that follow, the range of search of L for the maximum E(V) may be
narrowed.
1. Maximize E(V)
subject to:
m
Qj <_n-1j=l
m
cjQj
j=l
= C T (In the sense specified in the preceding paragraph).
j=l, .... m
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For themodel,therearisesa seriousproblemof definingtherangeof_to search. To
limit thequantityL to n-1 for largen still presentstherangeof possibilitiesfrom _to n-1.
In orderthattherangeoffeasiblesolutionbespecifiedmoreclearly, thefollowingcalculations
arenecessary.
(1) OrdercostsCj in increasing(decreasing)valueanddenotetheseorderedcosts
t
as Cj '. Here C 1 is the (minimum (maximum) Cj) and C m is the (maximum (minimum) Cj).
J J J J
(2) Reorder the indices of n. to correspond with Cj ' and denote them by nk3
(k = 1 .... m).
(3) For the upper bound L 2 of _, start by calculating the quantity Cj[ = C__ 1 + Cj '
where:
C_ = total cost of adding Q test points to a system
Cg_ 1 = total cost of adding _-1 test points to the system
C.' = cost of allocating the test point _ to the first or next unit in stage j.
J
Starting with C__ 1 equal to zero and C.z = C1 of the first stage, accumulate the cost-of
adding single additional test points in that stage until n 1 is reached. When this is accomplished
retain this total cost as C 1 and proceed to the next stage where C.' now becomes the nextJ
higher unit test point cost C 2. Mathematically this may be represented by:
C_= nkc +re.,
Lk:i ]
where: r = 0 and j ' = 1 initially and each time r equals nj, r is reset to zero.
When C_ > CT, the value of L 2 may be determined by calculating
j=l nj +r
(4) For the lower bound L 1 of J2, start with C 1 as the (maximum Cj ) and repeat (3).
(5) For each _ in the range L 1 < _ L2, find the Maximum E(V) which satisfies the
previous cost constraint on C L.
(6) Search (5) for the maximum of the maximums of the Maximum E(V)_andthereby
determine the value for L and the configuration of test points.
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Depending on the method utilized in making computations there is a necessary condition
that may be useful for eliminating configurations once L 1 and L 2 are determined.
Let Cj equal the minimum cost associated with adding one test point to a configuration
defined by some value L between L 1 < L < L 2. A configuration and its associated L consti-
tute the maximum solution if CT-CL < C Proof: Suppose C T- C L > Cj and the configura-
................ E L ....++_,v.,....... _,,_,_,_+^'_ ,,,;+h_,u,L -"_'_-y,_,_ a _,_Lmum E _vj = _v). Formulate a new cordiguration by
, L
adding the test point associated with Cj to the one yielding E L (V) and thus get some new
E iV) = E L (V) + • where • is a positive quantity. But this means that E L (V)<E L (V) + •
< E L + I(V) and therefore there exists a configuration of L + 1 test points which yields a
greater E (V) than E L iV) and satisfies the constraint of C L + 1 < C T. Therefore only those
configurations which have a cost in the interval C T - C L _> Cj are members of the set of
maximum solutions of (5).
2. Maximize E(V)
subject to:
m
Z ._j_L
j=l
m
cj]j= C T
j=l
(As specified in 1)
This case is, for computation purposes, identical to 1 above, with the excep-
tion that the upper bound L 2 is fixed by the constraint. Having found L1, the problem may be
solved in the same manner as before.
3. Maximize E/V )
subject to:
m
_ Q.=L
j=l ]
m
cj _j = C T (as specified in 1)
j=l
Here the problem is merely specifying the (?) configuration in the manner out-
lined in Case I-1 and make a search of this set to determine which ever satisfy the cost con-
straint. Having done this, it is only necessary to search these values of EiV) for a maximum.
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CaseIII C L < C T
The total cost C L of the allocation of L test points is less than or equal to some fixed
limit C T. There are gross similarities between the following three conditions on L and the
previous cases.
1. Maximize E(V)
subject to: L Variable
m
E c._. <_ CT
j=l JJ
_.-_n. j=l ..... m
l J
With L variable, this constraint allows flexibility to the decision maker simi-
lar to that found in Case I-2. However, here the procedure utilized in maximizing E(V) is
exactly the same as that found in Case II-1. In this instance, the maximum may be the same
as that found in Case II-1 provided that the costs C T are the same. The decision maker in
this instance has the flexibility to look at his entire set of possible decisions for L together
with their associated costs.
2. Maximize E(V)
subject to:
m
E_<-a
j=l :l
m
E c._.-_ C T
j=l ]J
_.-_n.
] ]
This case is for computational purposes identical to Case II-1, with the excep-
tion that the decision maker may request any number of plots from Case II-1 part (6) depend-
ing on the size of the increments utilized in specifying the values for C T-
3. Maximize E(V)
subject to:
m
E _.=L
j=l ]
m
c.L __c Tj=1 jJ
_,j --_nj j = 1, .... m
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Withthis constraintonL, thisdecisionmodelyieldsthesamesolutionfor Maximum
E(V)asthatfoundinCaseII-3 providedthatthevaluesfor CT arethesame. In thiscase,a
plotmaybemadeof increasingcostCT versusconfigurationfor fixedL andE(V). This may
beutilizedfor purposesof makingtradeoffsbasedondecisionmakerspreferencesfor speci-
fic typesof configurations.
Case IV c v_ri_b]_
-T .......
The total cost C T is allowed to assume any value necessary to maximize E(V). How-
ever, if it is assumed that the decision maker wishes to allow the test designer flexibility in
his allocations, it is reasonable to place a limit on C T equal to the maximum possible C T of
Case III. Having done this, the analysis of all of three types of constraints on L specified in
Case IF[ apply to Case IV.
Case V
For this case it is the desire of the decision maker to specify a level of E(V) he wishes
to receive from a system. Here the problem is to extract a fixed amount of information for
a minimal dollar investment. This case requires that the decision maker have some a priori
knowledge of the relationship between the values of L and the E(V) received as a result of
allocating L. This is the classical problem of setting requirements for a system test program
without having quantitative results of how it might perform in reality. Thus a vicious cycle
often arises, and the decision maker is all too often left to set his quantitative requirements
based merely on qualitative information. This case is not the entire cure for this problem
but merely sheds illumination on how one might attempt to begin to solve it. Returning to the
formalization of this case it may be stated as:
Minimize C_
subject to: E(V) _ E
m
j=l ]
l.<n.
J J
where:
L is fixed at n-1.
j--l, ..... m
C[ is the cost of allocating _ test points to a system (1 <_ _ <_.L)
E is the level fixed by the decision maker.
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To get an estimate for E, it is proposed that the decision maker first disregard the
cost problem and solve Case I-2 and make the plot specified there. Having done this, he may
utilize this curve to specify the level of E that he might judge as being acceptable.
From this point, the minimization of C 1 to meet or better this level E may be handled
- (1) . .
with the generalized technique developed by Kettele. Applying his techniques to this model
the payoff function A is defined as:
m _ _1 *
A = j-i_" _'s.=0 APsj (s{j)pj (tl-t0)
3
The problem of generating a dominating sequence by utilizing the algorithm is also
_!!eviated by the fact that the config-oration of units is fixed and the problem is placing test
points on these units. For discussion of the remainder of the algorithm see the above refer-
enced paper.
2-5 CONCLUSION
A. Requirements
In order that test design be developed in the manner described, the following para-
meters must be specified.
1. The fixed configuration of units to be analyzed, i.e. the system.
2. n. = the number of units in each stage j.]
3. k. = the least number of units required for stage success.
]
4. L = the maximum number of available test points.
5. C T = the maximum amount of dollars available for test program.
6. Decision criteria.
7. Probability functions Pj(t) for each stage
8. Time of test t1.
B. Limitations
If one can make the assumption that the operation or failure of every stage is
statistically independent of the operation or failure of all subsystems outside the stage, the
present technique of analysis may be extended to fairly broad class of systems of predomi-
nately serial configuration. These systems may include feedback loops, feedforward loops,
diverging branches and converging branches as described in great detail in Nemhauser's
book (2).
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Regardless of the configuration of the system model, the technique developed here can
handle any number of test points that a single unit may require. Here, the implication is that
the total number of test points necessary to verify the success or failure of a unit be grouped
as a unit test point. Thus no partial allocations to a unit are permitted. If only partial suc-
cess or failure information can be obtained on a unit then each element of the E(V) expression
must be rederived.
Another important aspect pertaining to the test points is that the cost functions
associated with adding test points within the stages must be monotomically non-decreasing
with the addition of each test point.
Because the magnitude of the computations for practical values of n is large, it is
recommended that before solution of any realizable system be attempted, the entire alloca-
tion procedure be implemented as a computer program for solution on a large scale digital
computer.
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¥ SECTION
IMPLEMENTATION OF AN
3
ADAPTIVE VOTER
3-I. INTRODUCTION
A. ADAPTIVE VOTER BACKGROUND
One of the most effective practical techniques for introducing redundancy into a digital
system is illustrated diagramatically in figure 3-1. The system is divided into a group of
identifiable subsystems, which are replicated two or more times and interspersed with
_11nF1_t_l_" IT/_flYI¢I_ /_11_111f¢_ A f_rn]n_l _rnHng circulf _rnln_ fh_ _f nf nn,_nln_11y irl_nfiP_l
signals at its inputs, and, based on this input information provides an estimate of what the
correct output signal from the subsystem set should be.
I_- SUBSYSTE M I L_
O. NON-REDUNDANT SYSTEM
b. MULTIPLE-LINE REDUNDANT SYSTEM
Figure 3-1. Segment of a Typical Redundant System
The most common restoring network is a "majority voter". In order to make a correct
n+l , of
estimate of the output for a set of subsystems, the majority voter requires that no T
*n is the number of inputs to the restoring network, i.e., the "order of redundancy".
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its inputs be failed to the same state. Although this network is effective when n = 3, it is very
inefficient when n> 3. This ineffectiveness exists because the percentage of the redundant sub-
systems which must be operating correctly to permit a correct vote is undesirably large. The
relative inefficiency of the majority voter can be seen by comparing the reliability vs time
curves shown in figure 3-2. The lower of the two curves characterizes a 35 input majority
voter. The upper curve represents the reliability of a nine input restoring circuit which has
the capability to estimate the correct subsystem output as long as any two of its inputs are
consistently correct.
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Figure 3-2. Reliability Vs. Time Curves for Two Voters
In order to realize the advantages of voters which can operate correctly with less than
a majority of correct inputs, some means of "deweighting" faulty inputs must be provided.
In studies of Stanford Research Laboratories and the Westinghouse Research Laboratories,
Dr. W.H. Pierce has devised several schemes for optimally weighting inputs as a function
of their past history of errors. (1) The general "adaptive voter" configuration which he has
proposed is shown in figure 3-3.
As part of this Failure Free Systems study, Westinghouse has been attempting to bridge
the gap between Pierce's theoretical studies and the construction and use of a practical
adaptive voter. This effort has revealed several important items concerning the adaptive
voting techniques which Pierce apparently did not consider in his general study. From his
relatively abstract viewpoint many of these items are relatively unimportant, but in relation
to certain feasible implementations, these items may be the dominating factors in the final
design.
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Figure 3-3. Adaptive Voter Configuration
For example, Pierce assumed that the probability of an error occuring in any input
channel was symmetrical, i.e., erroneous extra ONES and extra ZEROS were equally likely,
regardless of the i:_st history of the channel. In view of the voting schemes which he has
proposed, this assumption is not particular significant. However, at least one very simple
adaption scheme is known to exist in which the asymmetry of errors is critical to the
adaption process. The simplicity of this latter adaption scheme implementation is achievable
because the specific characteristics of one of the available weighting devices can be exploited.
To implement this scheme, a circuit can be devised such that if a series of asymmetrical
errors occurs at an input regardless of the ZERO or ONE orientation, the voter will deweight
to its minimum value (i. e., maximum impedance). This scheme is particularly attractive
because the circuitry required to monitor the existing value of an input "weight" is not re-
quired and no complex weighting function must be computed for each input.
As a second example, Dr. Pierce did not consider the "cost" of making a non-optimal
decision. In the above example, the proposed adaptive voter would probably not achieve
optimal vote weights, but if the cost of using non-optimal weights is sufficiently low, the
simplicity of the implementation will more than offset this cost.
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B. VARIABLE WEIGHT COMPONENTS
Inherent in the basic design of an adaptive voter is the requirement for an electrically
variable conductance (or weight) device which performs integration and displays relatively
permanent memory of the established weight. These special characteristics have stimulated
considerable effort toward the development of suitable adaptive components. The devices of
this type which have been proposed generally utilize phenomena involving atomic translation
or rotation.
During the first phase of this contract, an extensive survey of the more promising
of these devices was made. The results of this survey are described in detail in Appendix 3
of reference 2. The devices considered in this survey include three which exploit electro-
chemical effects and four which utilize magnetic domain phenomena. Briefly, there are:
1. Electrochemical Devices
a. The Memistor
The memistor consists of a sealed plating cell containing an electrolytic
bath, a resistive substrate upon which metal is deposited and a metal source electrode. The
conductance of the device is changed and stored by plating or stripping between two signal
electrodes and a third control electrode.
b. The Solion
The solion is a fluid-state device which functions by controlling and
monitoring a reversible electrochemical redox reaction, a chemical reaction in which
oxidation and reduction occur simultaneously. By controlling the charge transferred between
the two input electrodes, a change in conductivity proportional to the integral of the input
current may be obtained between two output electrodes.
c. The Mercury Cell
The mercury cell device consists of a capillary tube filled with two columns
of mercury separated by a "gap" or bubble of transparent aqueous electrolyte of metallic salt.
A d-c control signal is used to electroplate mercury across the gap, thus causing the bubble
of electrolyte to move. Read-out can be accomplished through any of several visual or
capacitance detection methods.
2. Magnetic Devices
Various techniques have been suggested for providing variable gain and non-
destructive readout with magnetic devices. The phenomena utilized in such devices is based
upon the ability of magnetic materials to store a remanent flux which is sensed in a non-
destructive manner. Suggested devices provide the capability for a partial switching of
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magneticdomainundera volt-secondimpulseasthebasicincrementingsource. Suitable
magneticmaterialsincludeferrites andtapewoundcoreswhicharecharacterizedby a
squarehysteresiscurve. Mostof thedevicesto bedescribedutilize thesamebasictypeof
incrementingtechniqueanddiffer primarily in themannerbywhichthestoredflux is sensed.
a. MAD Integrator
A diagram of a typical multi-aperture device is shown in figure 3-4.
Initially the flux around the main aperture is set to cause saturation. A momentary reversal
of the magnetizing force driving the main aperture will cause a partial reversal of the flux.
The amount of flux reversal is determined by the magnitude and duration of the drive and
the value of the hold current. The purpose of the hold winding is to retain a portion of the
core saturated in the original direction of magnetization and thereby assure partial switching
of the flux. The amount of flux alternately switched around the small aperture is then
proportional to the flux which has been switched around the main aperture. The output
voltage will consist of a signal whose voltage integral is proportional to the ameunt of flux
trapped in the common area between the two flux paths.
SENSE
WINDING
ADAPT _
HOLD OUTPUT
WINDING WINDING
Figure 3-4. Multiple Aperture Device (MAD)
b. Orthogonal Core Integrator
In this device the magnitude and direction of a stored flux is sensed by
applying a magnetic field orthogonally to the direction of stored flux. This causes the
remanent flux vector to rotate, generating a voltage proportional to its rate of change and
hence its magnitude. At the termination of the read drive the flux vector returns back to
its original preferred orientation by virtue of domain elasticity. The flux level stored in
the core is altered by pulsing input winding. The output signal consists of either positive
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or negativepulsesdependinguponthedirectionof thestoredflux, withanamplitudepro-
portionaltothemagnitudeof theremanentflux.
c. Second Harmonic Integrator
A second-harmonic generator normally consists of a pair of tape wound
cores driven from an r-f sinusoidal power source. The output winding is arranged so that
the fundamental component of drive voltage cancels out. leaving _ ,qecond harmoni_ distortion
voltage proportional to the remanent flux in the cores. The output is detected by passing a
single sense winding through the cores in the opposite direction.
By passing a direct current through the same sense winding the remanent
flux level may be altered. Due to an interaction between the d-c adapt current and the RF
drive the rate of change of the remanent flux with respect to the adapt current is constant
and reversible.
d. Magnetostrictive Integrator
The direction and magnitude of the net remanent flux in a magnetostrictive
core may be sensed if the core is excited mechanically. A simplified scheme for implementing
a magnetostrictive storage system employs an ultrasonic delay line to excite several
magnetostrictive toroids. Driving source for the sonic delay line is a piezoelectric trans-
ducer. Input to each of the toroids is provided by means of narrow width pulses through a
separate write coil concentrically with the read coil. If the frequency and rms amplitude of
the stress wave is maintained at constant value, the open circuit output of the read coil is
approximately proportional to the flux stored in the individual toroids.
C. COMPONENT EVALUATION
The following general observations were made during the survey.
The magnetic devices with their known sensitivity to temperature stress appear to offer
the least hope for providing analog memory with long term stability. The requirement for
providing carefully controlled incrementing with relatively large drive currents coupled with
the small output signals and associated amplification appears to dictate an imposing amount
of peripheral circuitry. The degradation in reliability as a result of this complexity
represents a liability which makes practical application doubtful for redundant systems.
The electro-chemical devices, especially the memistor and solion in their present
state of development, appear to be plagued by a number of stability problems. The memistor
with its dependence upon an electroplating process which is not widely understood, chemical
impurities and dimensional imperfections will require considerable refinement before
application becomes practical. In addition the requirement for sensing the state of the
device with an a-c signal makes circuit implementation rather awkward.
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Solionsappearto besomewhatmorepracticalif size is notanimportantconsideration.
It hasbeenreportedthattheRomeAir DevelopmentCenteris constructinganadaptive
learningmachine(CHILD)whichuses1080solions°With its dependenceonthechemical
equilibriumof a redoxsystemandthepreciseconstructionrequiredto achievestabilitythe
solionpresentsseveralchallengingdesigndifficulties. Therequirementfor providingan
isolatedbatterycell betweentheinputandshieldelectrodesimposesapracticalencumberance
ona systemdesignwhichrequiresalargenumberof solions.
At thecompletionof thesurvey,andat thebeginningof this phaseof thecontract,the
mercurycell integratorwithphotoelectricreadoutappearedto offer themostattractive
approachbecauseof its simplicity, stabilityin timeandgeneralcompatibilitywithcon-
ventionalcircuitry. Becausetheoutputis essentiallya variableresistanceproportionalto
_.,__,,_ _, ofthecontrol_,,_.... * _.......•_,_,*_,_devicecan_-_...._,_y:_-"_,,_:-*_-_^_^_, -"'*_w_u_more
standardcircuitry.
3-2. PROJECTDEFINITION
Theobjectiveof this projecthasbeento furtherinvestigatethefeasibilityof constructing
adaptivevotersof thetypeproposedbyDr. W. H. Pierce. To accomplishthisobjective,a
programwasestablishedto investigatetheavailabilityof thevariouselectricallyvariable
weightingdevicesandto constructandtesta modelof anadaptivevoter.
Theaccomplishmentof thefirst oftheabovesubgoalshowedthat, asaresult of a
developmentprogramconductedbytheDepartmentof Defense,oneversionof themercury
cell integratorwasavailableasamanufactureditem. Theparticularmodelwhichwas
availablehasphotoconductiver adout. Thiscorrespondsto thegeneraltyperecommended
for useinadaptivevoterapplicationbythepreviousurvey.
In concurrencewiththis finding,severalofthemercurycell integratorswerepro-
curedfor evaluation.Theremainingeffort onthistaskhasbeenconcernedwiththedesign
andconstructionof anadaptivevoterwhichemployedthesedevicesin anoperationalmodel.
Thespecificpurposein designingandconstructingthismodelwasto determinetheactual
usefulnessof suchdevicesin anadaptivevoterconfiguration.
3-3. MODELDESCRIPTION
Thebreadboardmodelofanadaptivevoterwhichhasbeenconstructedfor thispurpose,
consistsof ahybridcombinationofanaloganddigitalcircuitry andanon-linegeneralpurpose
computer.Thecomputergeneratesimulatedinputdatafor thevoterandperformsthefeed-
backadoptioncontrolfunctioninherento theoperationof thevoter.
In thefirst portionof this dualrole, thecomputerhasbeenprogrammedto injectinto
a randomdatastreama varietyof differenterrorpatterns. By selectingthepropererror
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pattern the investigator has the capability to modify the statistical properties of the voter's
input data to fit the requirement of almost any desired test. The use of the computer to per-
form the feedback control function offers the investigator an additional degree of flexibility.
To statistically test any proposed adaption scheme, a relative simple subroutine must be pre-
pared for the computer and inserted into the existing main program. To perform a test, the
investigator needs only to supply the computer with the particular adaption subroutine to be
considered and the information required to establish the simulated data characteristics.
The portion of the voter which has been implemented as actual circuitry consists of
digital control equipment which increments the variable input weighting devices, the analog
weighting devices, and output threshold and squaring circuits. Mercury cell integrators with
phof_-conductor readout were chosen as the input weighting devices. This choice was based
on the results of the previous survey of weighting elements, the lack of any more promising
new elements, the further development of these devices by the Department of Defense and the
availability of the refined elements as G. F.E. from the developers.
The following paragraphs describe the adaption scheme used in the model and the specific
nature of the computer programs and circuitry used to implement the model.
A. ADAPTION SCHEMES
i. Weight Values
Any binary decision element is a generalization of the majority organ introduced
by yon Neumann. (3) The binary generalization of this device is the adaptive voter shown in
figure 3-3. The binary numbers +i and -I are used as input signal levels both for their
conceptual simplicity and for their symmetry. The n input bits, each of which is +I or -i,
are individually weighted by a gain factor, a i. The resulting weighted signals are summed,
and then sent to a threshold element which gives an output of +I when the sum is positive, and
an output of -1 when the sum is negative. In equations,
.th
X.=l input digit i= 1,2,...n
1
n
+ _ x.a.Output of summation = a ° 1 1
i=l
where a. is called the i th vote weight
1
I n ]Device output = signum a ° + _ xia i
i=l
The adaptive voter reduces to the majority organ when a O
*One version of the voter weights each input and then normalizes the sum of the weighted inputs
by dividing by the sum of the vote weights.
equals zero and all other a i equal one. *
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The primary disadvantage of the majority-vote technique is that a consistently
reliable minority could be outvoted by an unreliable majority. This limitation can be over-
come by the adaptive vote-taker of figure 3-3 provided the reliable inputs are given heavier
vote weights and the unreliable inputs are given lighter vote weights. When errors in the in-
puts are independent, the vote weights, ai, can be chosen so that the output of the adaptive
voter is actually the binary state which is more likely to be correct. If the error probability
of the i th input is denoted by >, i' then the vote weights which give the optimum (i. e., more
probably correct) output are:
where x a
O O
Output -
n
x a + __, x.a.
o o 1 1
i=l
n
i=0
is the bias term, x i is the ith input and ai is the i th vote weight.
a = log a priori probability of +1
o a priori probability of -1
a. =log 1 i= 1,2,...n
1 )_i
If an input is completely random noise, i. e., k i = 1/2, then the optimum a i is zero. As
>' i decreases the optimum a i monotonically increases. Note that X i greater than 1/2
require negative inputs. An always wrong input, for instance, would provide always right
information if its output were inverted.
2. Schemes for Estimating Input Reliabilities
The following methods of adjusting the vote weights in a decision element have
been proposed by Pierce. (1) All use "X i' the estimated .therror probability of the 1 input,
to set the next vote weight to a. = log (1- _ i)/_ i"1
A
Adaption Method 1. X. is obtained from an analysis of the circuit which pro-
1
duces x i. This straightforward open loop adaption requires no data analysis.
A
Adaption Method 2-A, X i is obtained periodically from M comparisons of x i
with an externally supplied correct answer, This method is useful for the initial adaption
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of new circuits or routine preventive-maintenance adaption, occasionally using check problems.
The analysis required to pick M is similar to, and simpler than, the analysis which will be
given for Method 2-B.
Adaption Method 2-B. _ i is obtained periodically from M comparisons of x i
with the output of the decision element, treating the output of the decision element as if it were
always correct. The analysis of this method in Piercds work verifies an important con-
cept: A decision element can maintain its reliability by feeding back its own output in order
to judge the reliability of its inputs. This analysis justifies feeding back the output in other
adaption methods which are well suited to implementation but poorly suited to mathematical
analysis.
Adaption Methods 3-A and 3-B. These methods use Widrow's Adaline (4) to adjust
the vote weights. Reference 3 contains a description of the adaption procedure, and shows that
at equilibrium the vote weights are proportional to the hyperbolic sine of the optimum vote
weights. Reference 4 and 5 give circuit implementations used for pattern recognition. These
methods are of conceptual interest because they are based upon surface searching (6) and
practical interest because they may offer some reduction of components required for imple-
mentation.
Adaption Methods 4-A and 4-B. The only memory required for the i th input is the
.......... -)V--- N ................ is
present value of (1- k i)/ k i' the log of which is ai. The next value of (1-_ i)/_ i
incremented by f( _ i) if x i agrees with the comparison signal, and by g( _ i } if x i disagrees
with the comparison signal° The comparison signal is an external answer (Method 4-A), or
the output of the decision element (Method 4-B). Suitable functions are f( _ i ) = K, g( _ i) =
A A
K (1- k i)/k i' where K is a positive constant considerably smaller than one° These
methods are relatively simple to implement with electrical circuits.
Adapt!q_n_Met_hod_s 5_-A a)ld_5-B. A pulse is put into a linear low-pass filter for
every disagreement between x. and the comparison answer, which is an external correct
answer for Method 5-A or output of decision element for Method 5-B. If output of filter
exceeds {_, a i = 0. Otherwise, a i = 1. Excessive regularity in the statistics of the correct
answer may make it desirable to permanently keep a. = 0 if the filter output ever exceeds {}.
These methods are simple to implemenl and very effective against catastrophic failures.
The model of the adaptive voter which has been constructed during this program
employs Adaption Method 2-B. This choice was made primarily because Pierce had considered
this method in more detailed analysis and experiments could be designed to check the per-
formance of model against his theoretical work. Although this comparison was not a part
of this phase of the study, it may be desirable to perform the comparison at a later date. Again
it should also be noted that the adaption scheme used in the model can be easily changed by
changing the portion of the computer program which performs the feedback control function.
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B. THE COMPUTER PROGRAM DETAILS
1. The Simulated Input Signal Generation
To simulate the correct signal which would appear at each voter input if no errors
were present, the computer generates a random series of binary ZERO's and ONE's. The
average ratio of ONE's to ZERO's in the series is under the control of the input variables.
This input control or the signal characteristics allows the investigator to simulate signals
having different a priori probabilities of occurrence of either ONE's or ZERO's.
The simulated input signal to any particular voter input is a function both of the
correct signal described above and a second random variable which reflects the probability
of an error occurring on that input channel. The probability of error is determined by the
investigator according to environmental conditions he wishes to simulate. In determining the
probability of error, the investigator has the option of setting different error probabilities for
any input as a function of the binary state of the correct signal. Thus, a particular input
channel may display no errors, only erroneous ONE's, only erroneous ZERO's or a combina-
tion of the latter two, depending on the error probabilities associated with that channel.
Again as Pierce has noted (1) , one type of error in binary systems is caused by
thermal or other noise which occurs randomly in time. Another type of error occurs randomly
in space throughout the equipment, persisting from operation to operation; an example is
catastrophic failure. Errors, therefore, can occur randomly in time or space. As the pro-
gram is written, both time and space errors can be simulated with equal ease.
2. The Feedback Adaption Control Function
In addition to the peripheral function of input simulation, the computer also acts
as an integral part of the adaptive voter by performing the adaptive control function. In this
role the computer continuously monitors each input signal and compares it to the output of
the voter. During each operating period, a count is kept of the number of errors (i. e.,
disagreements with the voter output) observed on each input channel. At the end of M bits of
transmission, the ratio of error bits to total transmitted bits is calculated for each input.
^
This ratio is then used as the estimate of the error probability, k i' for the associated channel.
From this estimate, the weight (ai) for the channel is computed as described for Adaption
Method 2-B.
Once the desired weights (or changes in weights) have been determined, the
signals required to initiate any corresponding changes in the actual weighting devices are
generated and sent to interface control circuitry. The computer allows a predetermined
time in which to make the changes and then reinitiates the entire operation cycle.
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Figure 3-5. Adaptive Voter Breadboard Schematic Diagram
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fC. CIRCUITRY PORTION OF THE ADAPTIVE VOTER MODEL
The diagram shown in figure 3-5 includes both the actual adaptive voter circuitry and
the interface equipment required to connect the SDS 910 computer with the voter circuitry.
As the diagram shows, the particular version of the voter which has been constructed assumes
an order of redundancy of six, i.e. six nominally identical input channels.
1. The Voter Circuitry
The variable input weights of the voter are Curtis model 251 mercury cell inte-
grators (figure 3-6). As described previously, this device consists of a capillary tube filled
with two columns (electrodes) of mercury separated by a gap of aqueous electrolyte. A d-c
input signal electroplates mercury across the gap at a rate which is a direct function of the
amplitude of the _.put signal. The movement is in time within certain ranges nf photocnnductor
resistance; it is reversible without hysteresis and it is stable over long time intervals.
INPUT >
(OV OR-BY)
- _'".N__ I • OUTPUT
-4Vq
.L
Figure 3-6. Mercury Cell Integrator
The variable weight as a function of the current-time integral is obtained by
varying the quantity of light available to excite the photoconductor utilizing the gap as a light
shutter. Initial photoconductor resistance is determined by the type of photoconductor, light
intensity and initial alignment of the gap between the light source and the photoconductor.
One of the most outstanding characteristics of the model 251 mercury cell
integrator is the lack of uniformity between the resistance versus time curves for individual
units. The two curves shown in figure 3-7 illustrate the extent of the variation which might
be found between two of the integrators. This lack of uniformity between individual units
tends to cause a difference in input weights even though no difference should exist. To
overcome this problem, separate adaption subprograms for each input could be written for
the computer feedback loop, although the actual fabrication of such complex adaption
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Figure 3-7. Characteristic Curves for Two Mercury Cell Integrators
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equipmentwouldbehighlyunlikelyinpracticalapplications.As a resultof this, anestimated
averagecharacteristiccurvefor six relativelysimilarmercurycell integratorswasgenerated
andwasassumedto describetheir characteristics.(Seefigure 3-8). This curvewasfound
to closelyapproximatealogfunction;therefore,thelogfunctionwasselectedto represent
thecharacteristiccurvein thecomputerfeedbackcontrolprogram.
Inusingthisparticularmodelofthemercurycell integratorsseveralprecautions
arenecessaryfor properoperation:
a. Theintegratorcurrentshouldnotexceed5 milliamperes
b. Theintegratorshouldbeprotectedwithparallelback-to-back
silicondiodestopreventthevoltageacrosstheintegrators
from exceeding0.7 volts
c. Thelampvoltageshouldbelessthan5 volts
d. Thephotoconductorbiasshouldbeless than60volts
e° A minimumof 5secondshouldbeallowedfor theresistanceto
settleafter anintegrationperiodbecausetheintegrationcurrent
causesa transientchangein theelectrolytelight refraction.
Whenthevoteris transmittingsimulateddata,themercurygapsinall voters
remainstationary.As a result, thevoteweightsremainfixed. Thus,signalsappearing
at thevoter inputsarepassedthrougha resistivesummingnetworkto a thresholdcircuit*
(seefigure 3-9). Thelatter emitsabinaryONEor ZEROdependinguponwhetherthe
weightedaverageof the inputsreachesor fails toreachthepresetthresholdlevel.
Duringtheadaptionperiodof operation,anintegratesignalfrom thecomputer
setstheflip-flop* (figure3-10}intheintegrateline. This, in turn, stimulatestherelay
drivers* (figure3-11)whichenergizestherelays. Therelays* thenpassanintegrate
currentthroughthemercurycell integrators. Thetime integralof thecurrentdetermines
thedesiredchange(if any)in gaplocation;hence,theweightof eachintegrator. Duringthis
adaptionperiod, thestateof theflip-flop* in theinterfacecircuitry associatedwitheach
inputchanneldeterminesthedirectioninwhichthemercurygapin the integratorof that
channelwill move.
Duringtheadaptionportionof theoperation,thephotoconductorresistancecan
increasein somecellsanddecreaseinothersuntil theoutputof thethresholdcircuit is correct
for a giveninput. Thethresholdcanbemanuallysetto establishabiaswhichfixesthe
numberof inputsnecessaryto produceanoutput.
*Note: All circuits denotedbyanasteriskweresuppliedbyWestinghouseascompanyowned
testequipmentat nodirect costto this contract.
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2. The Interface Circuitry
The normal output channels of the SDS-910 are intended to provide signals to
external equipment only at certain intervals. These intervals are determined by an internally
generated strobe pulse which appears on a special output channel. Between the occurrences
of strobe signals, the integrity of the d-c levels of the other output channels is not maintained.
Because the integration control signals for the mercury cell integrators must be maintained for
relatively long periods of time (several seconds), special circuits must be used to convert
the SDS-910 output signals to d-c type signals. To accomplish this conversion a standard
flip-flop circuit (figure 3-10)has been inserted between the voter and the computer output
terminal in each channel. For the same reason the flip-flop was also inserted in the integrate
control line. Each flip-flop is fed the strobe signal through the clock driver* (figure 3-12).
The use of standard Lnverter amplifiers* (figure 3-13) preceding each S-R flip-flop permit_ the
use of "single-rail" data transfer from the computer. This avoids the necessity for the genera-
tion of both the signals and their complements by the computer.
Differences between the logic levels of the SDS-910 computer and the breadboard
circuitry also required the use of the Computer-to-Logic (CTL) and the Logic-to-Computer (LTC)
converters shown in figure 3-14 and 3-15 respectively. The level converters allows the
various interface signals to meet the following requirements.
Computer "ONE" Output -
Computer "ZERO" Output -
Computer "ONE" Input -
Computer "ZERO" Input -
Voter "ZERO" -
Voter "ONE" -
+6.5v. to +9.5v.
0.0v. to +0. 6v.
+5.0Vo to +20. 0v.
-2.0v. to +2.0v.
O.Ov to -2.Ov.
-6. Or. to -8. Ov.
*Note: All circuits denoted by an asterisk were supplied by Westinghouse as company owned
test equipment at no direct cost to this contract.
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3-4 RESULTS
A. OPERATION OF THE MODEL
The breadboard model of the adaptive voter, which has been constructed for this project,
has been subjected to sufficient testing to verify the operation of the device under a variety of
input error conditions. Because of the nature of the particular adaption scheme which was
chosen and because the integrate period in each operating cycle of the model was sufficiently
long, the vote weight of any input could be adjusted to the desired level without creating the
problem of convergence time.
In testing the voter, several weaknesses were noted. The primary difficulty arose be-
cause of the differences in the characteristic curves of photoconductor resistance versus time
between replicas of the mercury cell integrators. In the particular adaption scheme used
here, the existing theoretical value of the individual vote weights were stored in the computer
memory. As new theoretical weights were computed, any changes to be made in the vote
weights were determined by comparing the stored value of an input with the newly computed
value. The computer's version of both the stored vote weights and the newly compute d weights
are related to the photoconductor resistance in the mercury cell integrators through a single
ideal characteristic curve equation. As a result of this approximation, changes in resistance
of photoconductors called for in response to computed changes in weights are continuously
subject to error. Although the error made in any single adapt cycle may be small, the large
number of adapt cycles which would be encountered during the life of the System tend to make
the actual vote weights diverge from their intended value. This divergence has the combined
effect of creating wrong vote weight ratios between inputs of different reliability, and it
changes the ratio of the input channel series impedance to the fixed parallel impedance at the
threshold detector input. Since the latter ratio determines the threshold level of the detector,
this change can be extremely detrimental.
B. EVALUATION OF THE MERCURY CELL INTEGRATORS
The unique set of characteristics associated with the memory cell integrators definitely
provides a feasible means for implementing adaptive voters. Several of the characteristics
of these devices have been observed which make the integrators undesirable as circuit com-
ponents from either the user or the circuit designer's point of view. The remainder of this
portion of the report reviews the advantages to be obtained from the use of these elements
and describes some of the disadvantages also inherent in their use.
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I. Desirable Characteristics
a. It has been found that the output resistance of these devices is very stable in
time and is not sensitive to loss and restoration of power. This combined with the fact that
they required no power to operate except during the integrate operation periods makes them
particularly desirable for use in applications where low power levels are particularly de-
sirable or power may be temporarily lost.
b. The output resistance of the device is electrically adjustable across a continuous
range of values. This permits the adaption increments to be as finely grained as desired.
c. The average range of resistance values obtainable from the Curtiss model 251
integrators lies between approximately a megohm and a few ohms. This large range of values
facilitatesthe construction of adaptive voters having the wide range of input weights required
for reliable operation of the threshold output circuit.
2. Undesirable Characteristics
a. As figure 3-7 illustrates, the resistance versus time curves of the model 251
integrators have a symmetrical or "two-side" curve about some low resistance region. In
normal operation, the resistance of a particular integrator would be varied up and down one
side of this curve between the high and low resistance regions. It is obvious, however, from
an examination of these curves that an error in the integration timing at some point near the
low resistance region could transfer the operation region of an integrator to the opposite side
of the curve. This action would then tend to reverse the desired adaption procedure in that a
later signal which was intended to lower a vote weight might, in fact, increase the weight.
The results are obviously undesirable.
b. Because the output of this model of the mercury cell integrator is reflected
only by a change in resistance between the output terminals, the existing value of the output
must be determined by one of the following procedures. Either the equipment which deter-
mined the desired value of the weight must store that value, or special circuitry must be pro-
vided to physically interrogate the integrator. The first option was chosen for this model be-
cause the SDS-910 could handle the function easily. This method would be at least as cumber-
some as the second method in the type of voter models which would see use in large redundant
systems. Both of these methods would require enough circuitry to implement that the net
advantage of using a voter of this complexity would be doubtful. This does not necessarily
mean that mercury cell implementations of adaptive voters are impractical per se, but it
does mean that the adaption may have to be done on an incremental basis not requiring knowl-
edge of the previous value of the individual input weights.
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c. The difference between the resistence versus time curves of different nominally
identical mercury cell integrators has already been pointed out in section 3-3-c. Although
this characteristic obviously reflects a problem in quality control of the manufacturing pro-
cess, it definitely causes design problems at the present state-of-the-art in the use of these
components.
d. Although no controlled shock and vibration tests were conducted, the operation
of the devices seems to be relatively sensitive to these stresses. In one instance the in-
vestigator intentionally struck one of the integrators with a mild blow of an ordinary wooden
pencil and the photo-cell failed into the open circuit mode. As this indicates the sensitivity
to shock is apparently very high; therefore, the reliability of the devices in any type of mobile
equipment would probably be quite low.
3-5. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The results of this project have shown that adaptive voters can be constructed using
mercury cell integrators as the variable input weighting devices. The results have also
shown that the implementation of such voters using voting schemes which require computation
of optimal weight values require relatively complex feedback adaption control loops. This,
combined with the problems involved in using the presently available models of the mercury
cell integrators, leads to the conclusion that adaptive voters of this type are presently an
impractical means of improving the reliability of redundant systems.
Despite this rather negative conclusion, the potential improvement in system reliability
offered by the use of adaptive voters cannot be ignored. In order to advance the art toward
the realization of practical adaptive voting techniques, the following recommendations for
future work in this area are made.
1. The search for suitable weighting devices should be actively continued. Certainly,
physical changes in the mercury cell integrators which overcome some of the present problems
should be considered.
2. A broad range of adaption schemes including those proposed by Pierce should be
examined on a comparitive basis. The objective in performing this comparison would be to
determine the cost, in terms of lost reliability, of using simple, easy to implement schemes
rather than the more sophisticated "optimal" adaption schemes. Although many adaption
schemes are not amenable to mathematical analysis, the comparison would be relatively easy
to perform through the use of a computer simulationprogram similar to the one used in the
present project. In this case, however, the entire voter would be simulated rather than just
the feedback adaption control loop.
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3. Usingtheresultsofthecomparisonstudyrecommendedaboveandif suitable
weightingdevicesareavailablewhichhavethecharacteristicsrequiredbytheparticular
adaptionschemesunderconsideration,completebreadboardmodelsof themorepromising
schemeshouldbeconstructedandtested.
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SECTION 4
AN IMPLEMENTATION OF A
FAILURE RESPONSIVE SYSTEM
4-1 INTRODUC TION
One of the main goals of the current phase of the contract is the development of effective
techniques for implementing failure responsive systems. As described in an earlier report 1
failure responsive systems are redundant digital systems which have the capability to partially
reorganize themselves in response to the occurrence of detrimental internal failure patterns.
In failure responsive systems, the failure of a stage to meet the system's operational criteria
will initiate an action to switch a subsystem from another stage to restore the vulnerable
stage to operation.
One method of performing this partial system reorganization would be to use a central
controller to detect errors or failures, sense the need for reorganization, and perform the
switching of the spare subsystems from a "healthy" stage. It should be noted, however, that
a failure within such a vital central controller would result in the complete loss of reor-
ganizational capability for the system. Having foreseen this difficulty, the effort on this
task has "been concentrated exclusively on systems with distributed error detection and
switching capability.
The implementation of this distributed function philosophy requires special circuitry to
perform both errOr detection and switching at each subsystem location. The first goal of
this part of the study has been the development of techniques for implementing this circuitry
in a manner such that failure responsive systems are compatible with modern semiconductor
circuits. The second goal has been to design a specific study vehicle which can be used to
demonstrate the feasibility of such systems.
4-2 GENERAL CONSIDERATIONS
A. Comments on Switching Strategies
The first problem to be solved in optimizing the design of a failure responsive
system is the determination of a strategy for calling to the aid of vulnerable or failed stages
the replacement subsystem which can be most easily sacrificed by the remainder of the system.
Special Technical Report No.
Organizations," Appendix.
5, "Analysis and Development of Failure Responsive System
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Theobjectiveofthecomputersimulationtestprogram,reportedin theAppendix,wasto de-
terminethecharacteristicsof anoptimumreplacementselectionpattern. It wasconcluded
from thissurveythatall subsystemsshouldhaveapproximatelyequalrelocationpotentialand
thatthreeto five "spares",replacementsubsystems,perstagewassufficientfor mostappli-
cations. Fromapracticalstandpoint,it wouldseemthattheoptimalnumberof sparesper
stageseemsto beequalto theorderof redundancyof thesystemfor non-fractionalorders
of redundancy*.Thechoiceofthis numberof sparesresultsin everysubsystemhavingthe
capabilityto moveto onlyonelocationotherthanits original. Thisconditiongreatlysimplifies
theperipheralcircuitry requiredto electronicallypositiona subsystemin aparticularfunc-
tional location. In addition,this numberof sparesperstagepreciselysatisfiesthedesired
characteristicofanequalnumberof potentialocationsper spare.
B. InputControlof SubsystemMemory
Thebasicpremiseof thefailureresponsivesystemswhichhavebeenconsidered
in this studyis thata properlyoperatingsubsystemcanperformthefunctionfor whichit was
intendedif it is suppliedwithaset ofcorrect inputsignals. Thispremiseis notnecessarily
true if thesubsystemscontainactivememoryelements.Evenif all circuitsareworkingand
theinputsarecorrect, a correctoutputcannotbeguaranteedunlessthememoryis first set
to theproperinitial state. If thefailure whichhasgeneratedtheneedfor repairat a certain
functionalocationalsocausesambiguityto existbetweenthememoriesof thesubsystems
originallyassignedto thatlocation,aparticularlytroublesomeproblemwill emerge.Before
anysubsystemsof this typecanbehandledbyfailureresponsivesystemtechniques,a methods
mustbefoundfor determiningthecorrectmemorystateassociatedwith thevulnerablestage
andfor settingthememoryelementsof thesubsystemseffectingtherepair to thecorrect
state.
Thefailureresponsivetechniquesdevelopedin this studyprovidea solutionto at
leastpartofthis problem. If thestateof thememoryelementsof thesubsystemsbeingcon-
sideredarecontrolledentirelybytheinputsignals,the implementationtechniquescanallow
thestateofthememoryto besetbytheinputsignalsbeforeeffectingavote. This technique
assuresthatthefailedsubsystemwill bedeterminedandeliminatedfrom thesystem.
* Fractionalorderedsystemsare thosenothavingthesamenumberof subsystemreplicas
at eachstage.
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In addition,in systemscontainingsubsystemswhosememoryelementsare periodically
reset to a givenstate, the subsystemswitchinganderror eliminationcanbeproperly
timed in relation to this cycle. Theerror eliminationfunctionis simply delayed
until the memoriesof all of the subsystemshavebeenreset.
C. MultipleInputsandOutputs
In orderto switcha subsystemcontainingonly oneinputandoneoutput,a certain
minimumamountof switchingcircuitry is required. This minimumamountis a functionof
thetotalnumberof locationsto whichthesubsystem aybeassigned.At leastthreelogic
gatesat thesubsysteminputandthreeattheoutputare requiredfor a subsystemcontaining
a singleinputanda singleoutput,inorderto enablethesubsystemto performonlyonemove.
If thenumberof inputsis doubled,thenumberofgatesis likewisedoubled.This factor
limits thenumberof inputsandoutputswhichcanbehandledbyanyreorganizationalscheme,
butthis limit is notseverelyrestrictive. Theimplementationtechniquedemonstratedbythe
studyvehicledesignprovidesa meansfor simultaneouslyswitchingmultipleinputsandout-
puts, withoutseriouslyincreasingthecomplexityof theswitchingcircuitry.
D. Vital Elementsin theSwitchingCircuitry
In anyfailureresponsivesystemtherewill appearsomesectionsof peripheral
switchingcircuitry whicharevital to theoperationof thesystem. Themajorityof the
peripheralcircuitry will affecttherepaircapabilityof onlyonestage,or onesubsystem;
however,thereare casesinwhichafailure of avital elementin theswitchingcircuitry or
in thestageoutputcircuitry will causeimmediatesystemfailure.
Thereareseveralwaysto protectthesystemagainstsuchcatastrophicfailures.
Theonlyapparentsolutionto this problemis to introducefixedredundancybymakingthis
vital circuitry eitherfunctionalredundantor componentredundant.
In thedesignofthestudyvehicle,theobjectivehasbeentoprovethefeasibilityof
failure responsivesystemdesigns,andnoefforthasbeenmadetoprotecthesystemagainstall
of thefailure modesof everycircuit function. Insomecases,however,themorecritical
switchingfunctionshavebeenprotectedagainstheeffectsoftheir mostseriouscircuitry
failure modes. In anyfinal designof apracticalfailureresponsivesystem,protectionof
vital systemfunctionswouldhaveto beprovided.
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E. SubsystemCharacteristics
In convertinga non-redundantdigital systemto afixedredundantconfiguration,
almostnorestrictionsareplacedonthefunctionalrequirementsof thesubsystemsintowhich
thesystemis divided. For example,theactualfunctionaloperationof subsystemsupplying
a setof nominallyidenticalbinarysignalsto asetof majorityvotershasabsolutelynoeffect
onthevoter'scapabilityto resolveerrors.
In failureresponsivesystem,a similar situationexistsduringtheearlylife oper-
ationbeforemultiplefailureshaveoccurredin anystage. Duringthis earlylife period, the
systemsoperatelike multiple-linesystems,andthefunctionalrequirementscouldvaryfrom
stagetostagewithoutcausinganydifficulty. Theproblemariseswhen "repairs" areat-
tempted.In orderfor aworkingsubsystemto effectivelyreplaceonewhichhasfailed, the
replacementmustbecapableof duplicatingthefunctionof thefailedunit. Thisrequirement
meansthata subsystemwhichhasthepotentialcapabilityto operatein morethanonelocation
musthavethecapacityto perform, notonlyits originalfunction,butalsothefunctionre-
quiredateverylocationtowhichit maybemoved. If in fulfilling this requirement,a sub-
systemmustperformeventwosignificantlydissimilar functions,the increasein subsystem
complexityof thecircuitry requiredto implementbothfunctionsandto permit switchingbe-
tweenthefunctionscouldeasilyoffsetthe improvementin systemreliability soughthrough
theuseoffailure responsivesystems. Unlessa simplemeanscanbefoundfor changingsub-
systemfunctions,this offsettingeffectseemsto limit theapplicabilityof failure responsive
techniquesto systems(orportionsof system)whichcanbedividedintofunctionallysimilar
subsystems.
Evenbeforeoneattemptsto designa realizablefailure responsivesystem,a second
practicalrestraint onthecharacteristicsof individualsubsystemscanbeobserved. In order
to electronicallyswitchasingleinput, singleoutputdevicebetweentwolocations,theminimal
requirementsof onegateper locationfor boththeinputandtheoutput,anda memorydevice
to storethedesiredlocationmustbemet. Whenthecircuitry requiredto generatesignals
for callingsparesandto performerror detectionandcorrectionis addedto this minimal
controlcircuitry, it becomesapparentthatthecomplexityof anindividualsubsystemmustbe
fairly largeto beevenequalto theperipheralcircuitry requiredpersubsystem.Neither
thecomplexitynorthehomogeneityrequirementaloneis particularlysevere,butthecom-
binationofthetworequirementsrestricts theapplicabilityof failure responsivetechniques
to a relativelysmallclassof systems.
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4-3 THESTUDYVEHICLE
A. DesirableCharacteristics
A studyvehicledesignis requiredin orderto verify thepracticabilityof both
theorganizationals_ategytheoriesandtheimplementationtechniqueswhichhavebeen
developed.Thevehiclemustbechosento taxdesigncapabilityto thelimit of theart, and,
moreimportantly,to demonstratethatthesetof failureresponsivetechniquesdevelopedcan
providea powerfultoolfor increasingtheusefullifetimeof spacebornedigital systems.
Specifically,a studyvehicleis neededwhichcontainsometypeof memory
capability,suchasflip-flopsor shift registers. This is necessaryto demonstratethe
capacityof the implementationtechniquesto handlethecomplicationsassociatedwiththe
switchingof memoryelements:Thestudyvehicleshnuldalsodemonstratethatthetechniques
cansuccessfullyhandletheswitchingof multipleinputsandoutputs. Thespecificvehicleshould
containseveralidenticalor at leastverysimilar subsystemswhichare requiredto perform
in differentlocationsin thesystem. Thecircuitry associatedwiththesubsystemshouldbe
at leastas complexastheswitchingcircuitry neededto implementhefailure response
capability. It is alsodesirablethatthevehicleoperateinsomedefinitecycle, rather than
performonlyoneoperationcontinuously.
After anextensiveinvestigation,it wasdecidedthatthetypeof systemwhichwould
bestencompassall of thesecharacteristicswouldbea specialpurposearithmeticunit. The
specificstudyvehicleselectedis thearithmeticsectionof abeamsteeringcomputerfrom a
phasedarray radarsystem. Thisunit receivesdata,performsa numberof arithmetic
operationsonthedata,temporarilystoresintermediateresults, a_dthenreadsoutthefinal
resultsof thecomputationsandis reset. Theunitincludesall of theabovecharacteristicsof
adesirablestudyvehicle.
B. Descriptionof a Non-RedundantBeamSteeringComputer
A beamsteeringcomputeris requiredin aphasedarray radarsystem,to compute
thesettingsofthephaseshiftersassociatedwith thephasedarrays. Thespecificsystem
beingconsideredhereis soorganizedthatsettingsarecomputedfor groupsof phaseshifters,
eachgroupbeingarrangedin a separaterowor columnof thearray. Thisallowsonlyone
settingto becomputedfor eachrowor columnofphaseshifters, rather thantheseparate
calculationfor eachindividualphaseshifterwhichmightotherwiseberequired.
Thecomputationsfor derivingthephasesettingsof therowsor columnscanbe
reducedto thefollowingform:
(1)_n= _o + nK + n2C + S i
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where
_o = the phase setting of the reference row or column. (This
will probably be selected in the center of the array and
be fixed to a value of zero. )
n = An index which may assume either positive or negative values
and which indicates the position of a row or column relative
to the reference row or column (i. e., for the row immediately
above the reference row n would equal +1 and for that
immediately below the reference row n would equal -1; the
next rows above and below would have n = +2 and n equal
-2 respectively. )
K = A factor which is a function of the fixed array geometry,
the transmission wave length, k , and the beam angle, 0.
(0 is measured horizontally for columns and vertically
for rows. )
C = A set of factors which is a function of the fixed array
geometry and the beam spoilage, R.
S. = A set of compensation factors for the non-planar wave
1
front which is directed to the array. This factor is
distinct for each separate row or column with the excep-
tion that there is symmetry about the center of the array;
io e_, i equals the absolute value of n.
th
_n = The phase setting of the n row or column.
An efficient method of implementing this computation may be seen by expanding
equation (1), using the following relationships:
2 2
n = (n-l) +2n-1
n=n-l+l
substituting in equation (1):
(2) J_n = J_o + (n-l)K + (n-l) 2 C + K + (2n-l)C + Si
By inspection, we see that the first three terms are equal to _n-l* less the
compensation factor. Therefore,
(3) _n = _n-l* - Si-1 + K + (2n-l) C + Si
*Equal to _n+l for values of negative n.
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Thus it will be possible to compute the phase settings by a process involving only simple
additions or subtractions relative to the previous phase setting if the settings are sequentially
determined in the order of increasing distance from the reference row or column.
A block diagram of the beam steering arithmetic unit used to calculate _n is shown
in figure 4-1. The circuitry consists of four shift registers and six one-bit serial adders or
subtractors. In addition, storage for the compensation factors, Si, is provided. These factors
are fixed by the geometry of the array and are implemented by combinational logic used in
conjunction with a shift register to provide a serial output. The necessary timing signals are
providedby two counters with associated decoding gates.
In the configuration shown, the three adders in figure 4-1(a) are used to calculate
the pha_e _ettings of rows or culunms offset in a positivedirectiu_h'om the i'eferencerow
or column, while the adder and two subtractors in figure 4-1(b) are used for those offset in
a negative direction. Thus, two phase settings will be computed simultaneously (one above
and one below the reference column). Table 4-1 shows the initial contents of the registers and
the contents at the beginning of the computation of _n" The outputs are directed to shift
registers which store computed results, and a parallel output from these registers is used
to drive the phase shifters.
SERIAL
RESET RI ONE-BIT
TO K+ ADDER
2C m
RESET
TO @o r4,[ R3
,i
SERIAL
ONE-BIT
ADDER
(a) POSITIVE N
=[ A3 I OUTPUT
_] SERIAL _ FOR
__.J ONE-BIT I - POSITIVE
ADDER I N
_COMPENSATION
FACTOR (Sn)
RESET
TO K-C
2C
RESET
TO _o
SERIAL SERIAL SERIAL
ONE-BIT ONE-BIT ONE-BIT
SUBTRACTOR SUBTRACTOR ADDER
(b) NEGATIVE N
Figure 4-1. Beam Steering Arithmetic Unit
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TABLE I. CONTENTS OF ARITHMETIC UNIT REGISTERS
Register
R1
R2
R3
R4
Contents
Prior to the Computation
Reset (assuming positive values of n)
K+C
K-C
K + (2n-l)C
K + (-2n+l)C
¢n-I - Si-i
O-n+l - Si-i
C. Description of the Failure Responsive Beam Steering Computer
The non-redundant beam steering arithmetic unit operates on a three-phase cycle:
(1) data input, (2) computation and storage, and (3) results read-out and reset. The failure
responsive version of the computer has been designed so that the error detection and correction
is properly timed in relation to this cycle. All errors are detected during the computation
phase, and error correction is accomplished through system reorganization during the results
read-out phase, when the unit is waiting for new data.
One stage of the failure responsive beam steering computer is shown in figure 4-2.
The arithmetic unit for positive n, in figure 4-1(a), has been chosen as the subsystem of the
failure responsive version of the computer. This subsystem will also perform the computa-
t-ions for negative n if the two adders, A 1 and A2, are changed to subtractors. This can be
done by inverting the input which is to be subtracted, and changing the end-of-computation
RESET to a SET. As can be seen in figure 4-2, these two changes are handled by the gating
circuitry on the subsystem's adder inputs.
In order to provide simultaneous signals for both the rows and columns of the
phased array, displaced in both the positive and negative directions from the reference
rows and columns, four arithmetic units are required in the non-redundant computer. Two
units perform the computations for positive n, and the remaining two perform those for
negative n. Since there are four non-redundant units, the failure-responsive design comprises
four stages, with each stage triplicated, making a total of twelve subsystems. A block diagram
of the system arrangement is shown in figure 4-3.
1. The Switching Strategy Employed
During the portion of the failure responsive systems study described in the
Appendix, a comprehensive set of design rules was established to aid the designer of such
systems. Much of the emphasis was placed on the investigation of subsystem switching
strategies, with the result that many strategies were found which provide a significant
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Figure 4-3. Block Diagram of Failure Responsive Arrangement
improvement over the reliability of multiple-line redundant systems. The most effective
strategy was found to be the progressively distributed step list pattern, represented dia-
grammatically in figure 4-4. In the figure, each block represents a subsystem replica and
each column of blocks represents a stage of the system. The spare list for subsystem X
consists of the numbered subsystem replicas. Subsystem 1 would be the first "spare" to go
to the aid of X's stage, subsystem 2 would be the second, and so on. Because of the distributed
characteristic of this strategy, it provides a significant reliability improvement only for systems
containing a large number of stages, such as the twenty-stage system used in the evaluation.
For a relatively small system the distributed step list is not feasible, and the step list strategy
shown in figure 4-5, provides the best reliability improvement. This strategy was chosen for
the design of the four-stage beam steering computer. The design provides for three spares
for each of the four stages, one spare being selected from each of the other three stages. The
manner of detecting errors in the output of a stage, physically locating and switching the proper
spares, and eliminating errors is discussed in the following sections.
2. The Classes of Circuits
The study vehicle design is composed of three main classes of circuits:
(a) input-output channel selection circuitry, (b) error detection and correction circuitry, and
(c) location control circuitry.
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Figure 4-5. Step List Pattern
a. Input-Output Channel Selection
The input selection circuitry consists of the input gating at the left of
the subsystems in figure 4-2. The inputs 2C, K+C, and S designate the inputs referred to in
the description of the non-redundant beam steering computer. The subscripts indicate the
stage of the system to which the inputs belong. The stage shown in the figure is stage n, the
one to the right of this stage is stage n+l, the next stage in line is stage n+2, etc.
The inputs which actually energize each subsystem are determined by
the location control circuitry. This circuitry energizes one of the two horizontal lines above
and below the corresponding subsystem and simultaneously deenergizes the other line.
Referring to subsystem A in the figure, there are two stages in which this subsystem could
be operating, stage __ or stage n+l. If redundant flip-flops L A are reset, the subsystem will
operate in stage n, and the "n" inputs will be fed into the subsystem. If the flip-flops are set,
the n+l inputs will be fed into the subsystem.
The output selection circuits operate in exactly the same manner.
The same two location control lines that energize the proper inputs, also energize the
corresponding outputs. The location control lines control the operation of the output selection
gates, at the far right extremes of the lines in the figure. The output of the lower of the
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output selection gates for subsystem A channels signals to the threshold voter circuit which
produces the output Xn, of stage n. In the same manner, the upper output selection gate for
subsystem A produces output Tn, which channels information to the stage n+l threshold
voter circuit.
The location control circuitry determines which part of the input-output
selection circuitry is operating and as a result, in which stages the subsystems are effectively
operating. There must also be provision for determining which of the subsystems are operating
properly and which ones should be eliminated from the system. This function is performed
by the error detection and correction circuitry.
b. Error Detection and Correction
The error detection and correction circuitry consist of the circuitry
in the lower right of figure 4-2, plus the "failure" flip-flops FA, FB, and F C with the
associated gating circuits which feed them. Error detection and correction, as mentioned
earlier, must be properly timed in relation to the three-phase cycle of the phased array radar
system. It also must _low for random noise which can occur in the input signals. To account
for both of these factors_ error detection is performed only during the computation phase,
designated as period B. But one error alone will not enable the spare call function. There
must also be a second error in the same stage during the second B period. Consider the
section of the error detection circuitry in the lower right of figure 4-2 when all flip-flops are
reset. An error signal from one of stage n's subsystems, signal )" n.' will set the first
1
flip-flop, FFI, during period B. At the beginning of the readout and reset phase (period C)
an external signal will set FF2. If the error signal )" , still remains at the next B period,
FF3 will be set, the failed subsystem will be eliminated by a n' and a spare subsystem will
be switched into stage n by the location control circuitry.
The ERROR signal, )" , is generated by the gating circuitry which con-
trois flip-flop FA, FB, or F C. Consider the circuitry associated with FA. If the output of
the output-channel-selection gate (subsystem output) does not agree with the stage output, Xn,
the difference detector produces a positive error signal, ). When the error elimination
n 1•
circuit energizes an' flip-flop F A is set, eliminating subsystem A from the system. As can
be seen in the figure, this error detection circuit is reproduced for every location of every
subsystem, providing distributed error detection for the system.
When a subsystem failure occurs, as described above, a "call" signal
is generated and directed to the location control circuitry. The location control circuitry
determines which of the "spare" subsystems can be moved to the weak stage.
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c. LocationControl
Whenthefirst failureoccursina stage,thefailedsubsystemis
eliminatedby majorityvote,sincethereare twooperatingsubsystemsremainingin thestage.
Whenthesecondfailureoccurs,asparemustbecalledfrom anotherstagein orderto perform
themajorityvote. Theorder in whichsparesareexamined,to determinetheir availability
to beswitched,i.qspecifiedbyth__tonli_f n_ff_'en "in ¢im,,,_ a-_ ,2_,_h ..... *_ .... _-_,_
in turn to see: (1) if it is in its original stage, and (2) if there are three operating subsystems
in the stage. If either of these is not true, the next spare in turn is examined. All three
spares are examined, if necessary. If none is available to be switched under the above two
criteria, the location control circuitry has the capability to "rescan" the spare list with less
stringent criteria. A spare will be switched if it is operating properly in its original stage
and there is one other operating subsystem in the stage. It is better to leave the spare's stage
with only one operating subsystem in order to resolve the ambiguity in the first stage, than
to leave the first stage output indeterminate, thereby causing system failure.
During the first scan of the spare list, there are three possible
circumstances which would prevent a particular spare from being switched:
A. The previous loss of a subsystem to another stage or
a previous failure in the stage has occurred
B. The spare itself has already moved or failed
C. The two other subsystems in the spare's stage have
previously moved or failed.
Assume that stage n requires a spare. The first spare to be examined
is subsystem A in stage n-1. This spare will be switched if conditions A and C above are
false. This will be designated as Move 1 = An_ 1 Cn_ 1. The second spare, in stage n-2, will
move only ff conditions A and C are false, and condition A is true for the first spare. Therefore
M°ve2_ An-1 _'n-2 Cn-2" In the same manner, for the third spare, Move 3 = An_ 1 An_ 2
An_ 3 Cn_ 3.
If no spares are available, the first spare on the list will be
examined again. The conditions for a move now are:
M°Vel = An-1 An-2 An-3 Bn-1 Cn-l"
The A's refer to the fact that the first scan produced no available spares. Bn_ 1 indicates
that the spare itself is operating, and Cn_ 1 indicates that there are two operating subsystems
in stage n-1. In a similar manner, the conditions for the second and third spares moving are:
Move 2 = An_ 1 An_ 2 An_ 3 Bn_ 1 Bn_ 2 Cn-2
Move 3 = An_ 1 An_ 2 An_ 3 Bn_ 1 Bn_ 2 Bn_ 3 Cn_ 3
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If wecombinethelast threeconditionswiththeconditionsfor a moveduring theinitial scan,
weobtainthetotalconditionsfor movefor all threespares:
MoveI =An_ 1 Cn_ 1 + An. I An_ 2 An_ 3 Bn_ I Cn_ 1
Move 2=An_ 1 An_ 2 Cn_ 2 + An_ 1 An_ 2 An_ 3 Bn_ 1 Bn_ 2 Cn_ 2
Move 3 =An_ I An_ 2 An_ 3 Cn_ 3 +An_ 1 An_ 2 An. 3 Bn_ I Bn_ 2
Bn_ 3 Cn. 3
(1)
(2)
(3)
The scan and rescan of the "spare list" described above would actually result in a relatively
slow reorganizational capability for the system. The actual location control circuitry, there-
fore, does not control switching in this manner. The three "move enable" equations (1), (2),
and (3) above are implemented with the combination logic associated with location flip-flops
LA, LB, and L C in figure 4-2. The output of this logic would be "and" ed with the appropriate
"call" signal. The entire scan and rescan is thus accomplished in a single bit-time. The
subscripts on the inputs to the location control gates are referenced to the stage which calls
the associated subsystem as a possible spare. Functions An, Bn, etc., are produced by the
peripheral gating circuitry shown in the figure. The subscripts on these functions, however,
refer to the stage pictured, n, and would need to be re-numbered to correspond to the inputs
of the location control circuitry.
The threshold circuit is essentially a two-out-of-n vote circuit. As
the figure shows, one of the inputs is Cn, the signal referred to above which indicates thatthere
is only one remaining subsystem in the system, the second having been switched to another
stage. This signal puts an added "ONE" on the voter input, allowing the one remaining
subsystem to control the vote, since there are no remaining spares to be called. By allowing
the remaining subsystem to control the vote in this manner, system life is further extended.
The location control flip-flops and combinational logic, having a vital
system function, are duplicated to increase system reliability. The error elimination network
and the output circuitry would also be replicated in the final design of operating systems.
c. The System Reliability
Using values of failure rates proportional to subsystem size and complexity,
the system was simulated on the Univac 1107 computer. The computer simulation program
used was the same program used for the establishment of design rules during the first phase
of the failure responsive systems study. The system proved to have a useful life* more than
twice that of a multiple-line redundant version of the same phased array radar system.
*Useful life is defined as the time at which the system becomes 90% reliable.
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The phased array radar subsystem is composed of 31 flip-flops and 33 logic
gates. The switching circuitry required to implement the failure responsive capability is
made up of I0 flip-flops and 93 gates. For the purposes of simulation, two different pessimistic
estimates of failure rates were made for the switching circuitry associated with each stage.
These estimates were then equally divided between the three subsystems of the stage. This
equal division has a very optimistic effect on system reliability estimates. Based on the failure
rates of presently available integrated circuits, approximate failure rates were also assigned
to the subsystems. The simulations included a comparison of the system with a multiple line
version of the same system. In addition to the simulation of the four-stage design, eight stage
versions of the same systems were simulated for comparison. The results of these simulations
using the two switching circuit failure rate estimates are summarized in table 4-2. In the
second case the failure rate of the switching circuitry was assumed to be 50% more than in
the first case.
Additional simulations of the failure responsive study vehicle were performed
with the error elimination network and voters assumed to be separate subsystems with no
repair capability. Failure rates proportional to system complexity were again assigned. A
failure in any part of the separate circuitry was assumed to cause system failure• Even with
this obviously very pessimistic assumption, the failure responsive design proved to have a
useful life comparable to that of the multiple-line system, which was assumed to have perfect
majority voting circuits.
TABLE 4-2. COMPARISON OF SYSTEM RELIABILITY
System
NON-REDUNDANT
Subsystem
Failure Rates
(Failures/Hr.)
•46 x 10 -6
Useful Life
(Hours)
Four Stages
57,300
217, 610
Eight Stages
28, 650
154, 460MULTIPLE-LINE .46 x 10 -6
FAILURE
RESPONSIVE .67 x 10 -6 564, 640 377,470
1.00 x 10 -6 378, 310
FAILURE
R ES PONS IVE
4-4 CONCLUSIONS
252,910
The design of a practicable system having failure responsive capability has been
accomplished. This design has shown that such systems can be implemented using standard
combinational logic circuits to form the various error detection, error correction and
"repair" switching functions which are required.
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Although the amount of peripheral circuitry required to implement the functions
mentioned above does not seem excessive, it may be concluded that the subsystems must be
at least as complex as those described for the beam-steering computer considered here.
The _uccessful design of this particular study vehicle demonstrates the applicability of failure
responsive system techniques to systems containing input controlled memory. In addition, the
design has shown that subsystems with multiple inputs can be handled with the reorganizational
capability of these systems.
The present design of the study-vehicle contains no specific provisions to protect the
system against all failure modes of the peripheral circuitry. In many cases, failures in this
circuitry will be treated as subsystem failures. The natural extention of this work would be
to continue the design effort to provide protection against all peripheral circuit failure modes
and to extend the computer simulation program to permit final design evaluation.
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SECTION $
MEDIUM COMMUNICATION FOR
MODULE REORGANIZATION
5-1. INTRODUCTION AND PROBLEM STATEMENT
This study has been one part of the larger program whose objective is to consider new
techniques which are expected to increase the reliability of vital electronics. Most of the
effort expended in the large program has been oriented toward developing techniques for more
effectively employing redundant equipment to extend overall system life. As one result of
this effort, it has been found that systems which have the capability to partially reorganize
the connection pattern linking their individual subsystems te.u.................Lo 1_w _,.-L_,,IL_y*"" _,.,,_'. ...
useful life spans than systems with a fixed subsystem configuration. The reorganization
capability allows these systems to avoid the use of failed subsystems and to maintain a uniform
distribution of the operating redundant subsystems. The two inherent primary difficulties
with systems having this capability are (1) the need for relatively complex interconnection
switching circuitry and (2) the need for higMy homogeneous subsystems.
The system organization which is described in the remainder of this report was originally
conceived as a means for implementing the "failure responsive systems" described above.
The primary purpose in developing this new organization was to reduce the complexity of the
interconnection circuitry. As will be shown, this initial investigation has resulted in the
formulation of a system organization which accomplishes the original purpose and provides an
extremely flexible technique for reorganizing systems into redundant and non-redundant
structures as the applicational requirements vary. The system organization which is proposed
has the added advantage that graceful degradation of the system functions are almost inherently
achievable.
As the organizational concept was proposed, the system function would be performed
by a group of subsystems communicating through a common medium. The channeling of the
information would be accomplished either by tagging the data with some time or frequency
code, by providing an instruction program within each subsystem or by providing a central
controller which would be associated directly with the medium. The objectives of the study
reported here has been to consider the feasibility of constructing systems organized in the
above manner and to formulate the basic design configuration of a system of this type.
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5-2. SYSTEMCHARACTERISTICS
A. MEDIUMS
1. ChannelEconomy
Anysysteminwhicheverysubsystemhasthecapabilityto communicatewithevery
othersystemis oftenreferredto asa "stronglyconnectedsystem". Systemsmaybestrongly
connectedthroughasystemof individualsignalchannelsuchaswiresor throughacommon
mediumsuchasa gas,a liquidor ablockof solidmaterial. Subsystemscommunicatingover
individualsignalchannelsmayrequireas manyasN2 undirectionalchannelsor at leastN2/2
bidirectionalchannelswith theassociatedchannelselectioncircuitry availableat eachsub-
system. If, however,a mediumis usedasa centralnodethroughwhichall datapasses,the
characteristicsof a stronglyconnectedsystemareretained,but thenumberof channelsis re-
ducedto2Nunidirectionalchannelsor Nbidirectionalchannelswithall or mostofthechannel
selectioncircuitry confinedto themedium.
A typicalalthoughrathermundanexampleof theeconomyof usinga central
mediumtocontainthechannelselectioncircuitry is thetelephonesystem. Inthis casethe
switchboardfills therole of amediumwhichperformsall thechannelselectionfunctionsfor
thesystem. Thisexamplealsoillustratesthata largesystemmightprofitablybebrokenin-
to segmentsorganizedaroundindividualmediaeachof whichcommunicateswith theother
media. Althoughthequestionis academicat this point,thequestionof whetherthe individual
mediashouldcommunicatedirectlyor througha "higherrank" mediais onewhichmustbe
solvedbeforethevery large, complexcomputingsystemscouldbeimplemented.
2. MediawithMemory
Theuseof amediumasa commonsignalchanneldoesnotnecessarilyimplythat
themediummusttransmitthesignalsinstantaneouslywithoutintentionallyintroducedelay.
Byconsideringthecentralmemoryof adigital computerasanothertypeof medium,it is
immediatelyobviousthatthe informationstoragepropertiesof anelectronicmemorymaybe
highlyadvantageousin manymedia. In a systememployingmultipleredundantreplicasof
eachsubsystemto achievehighersystemreliability, theuseof a subsysteminterconnection
mediumwithstoragepropertiesimmediatelyoffersthefollowingdesirablepossibilities.
a. Individualsubsystemsmayoperateasynchronously.
b. If votingspeedexceedscomputationalspeed,votingmaybedoneby rela-
tively fewvotersin commonpoolvotingonthecopiesof datastoredin
themedium.
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B. BASICSYSTEMOPERATION
Theinterconnectionof subsystemsthrougha storagemediumdoesnotnecessarilyre-
strict thechoicesof memoriesto anysmallerclassthanwouldnormallybefoundin a modern
digitalcomputer.Becausethemechanicalscancharacteristicsofa drummemoryseemto
beparticularlyusefulin this typeapplication,thespecificsystemimplementationwhichhas
beenconsideredin mostdetailduringthis studyassumestheuseof adrum.
Thecomputingsystemconsistsprimarily ofa numberof semi-autonomousprocessing
unitsinterconnectedthroughthemediumof adrummemory. Theconfigurationofthesystem
is illustrateddiagrammaticallyin figure5-1. Inthis systemeachprocessingunitpicksup
from thedruma setof wordsandanassociatedinstruction(orsetof instructions)which
specifythefunctiontn beperformedonthedata. Havingpickedupthedataandtheinstructions,
theprocessorinhibitsits 'read'headuntil theprocessingis finishedandtheresultshavebeen
writtenonanothertrack. Theresultsareaccompaniedbyatagidentifyingthesubsystem
whichlast processedthatblockof data. Intheredundantconfigurationthis track is knownas
the"vote"track. In the particularsystemillustratedthereare threevotetracks. Thesub-
systemnowreadsthenextsetof dataandinstructionandcontinuesprocessing.Eachset
of datais processedbythreedifferentsubsystemsandtheresultsareplacedonseparate
tracks. Thevotingcircuit doesnotoperateuntil thetriplicatedsetsofresultsareproduced.
A majorityvoteis performedwhenthetriplicate setof resultsis available. Theoutputof
thevoter is sentto a centralprogrammer. If onesubsystemhasfailedandproducesincorrect
data,thevoterwill detecthis andinhibitthis subsystemfrom performingthatparticular
functionagain.
Theexampleshownin figure 5-1 will perform ten different functions on the data in any
order (with repetitions or iterations possible. ) The order is chosen by the central program
which sends the result of the voting to a location on the drum associated with the next function
to be performed. The subsystems which will subsequently perform the function will depend
upon which are free when they scan that location.
The weakness of such a system lies in the central programmer and its associated
switching circuitry. This may be made more reliable by having three copies and voting or by
other methods. However, a more ideal solution is to abolish the central programmer alto-
gether. This may be accomplished by a variety of methods, leading to the system in figure 5-2.
In this version of the system, the voting is a function of some portion of the subsystems. The
flow of data through this system is controlled by a type of list processing, where each instruc-
tion includes the address of the next instruction, or each set of data may carry an additional
'tag' which instructs the subsystems as to the next function to be performed.
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One greatly simplified memory arrangement will be used to illustrate some of the con-
siderations (figure 5-3). Track 1 is a timing track. Each unit picks up the clock pulses from
this track and hence its position in storage. The pulses also act to operate instruction se-
quences within each unit, to trigger shaping pulses, etc.
Track 2 is the program track, which stores the basic program. The program is read
in by a special input which prevents any processing units from writing on this track, thus in-
suring that the fundamental program is protected in spite of all failure modes in the units.
This program contains all the instructions and constants necessary for the processing. The
inability of the units to modify the basic program does not limit program versatility; it would
be possible to transfer parts of the program to another track (where they could be modified, )
and temporarily transfer control of the unit to this track. If some failure now occurs, a sub-
I CENTRALI,_PROGRAM
• m
COMPUTING VOTING
SUBSYSTEMS SUBSYSTEMS
Figure 5-1. System Organization Diagram
COMPUTING
SUBSYSTEMS [_]
VOTING OR COMPUTING
SUBSYSTEMS
Figure 5-2. Revised System Organization Diagram
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system is lost but not the central program. Another desirable feature to build into such a
program is the periodic sensing of a track under the control of the operators console. If the
computer is on a space mission this sensing could be controlled from a remote console. This
permits the operator to have some control over the processing units, although not absolute
contro 1, and he cannot destroy the main program by errors in transmission (which have high
probability in deep space communication). The control of a unit would temporarily be trans-
feted to the operators track if the program sensed the transfer signal. Transfer back to the
main program would occur automatically after a number of instructions. Hence a communi-
cation error may result in temporary disability of a unit, but has no effect on the main pro-
gram, or other units.
On Track 3 the certifieddata is stored_ This is the output ofthe voters, and the input
to the processors. Itisalways assumed to be correct.
Tracks 4, 5 and 6 contain the uncertifieddata. This data isthe output ofthe processors,
and the input to the voters. A voter willread these tracks simultaneously and transfer the
result which is 'votedcorrect' to the certifieddata track. Each unit would normally read and
write on only one of the vote tracks (4, 5, 6), unless the unit was functioningas a voter.
This divides the units intothree classes. Some or allof the units would have the facilityto
change classes, otherwise the system would failas soon as allunits in one class failedwith
no possibility of transferring a good unit from another class.
As the system is now conceived, the individual subsystem may perform a series of
functions in a prescribed sequence or the subsystems may form a complex queue to perform
the functions as determined by the availability of certified data. For example, series of
functions (F1, F2, F 3 ... Fn ) are to be performed on the data words (D1, D2, D 3 ... Dn)-
Referring to figure 5-2, the first subsystem to become idle (Subsystem A) will compute
FI(D1). The next two subsystems to become idle will also compute FI(D1) and store the
results on the vote tracts. During the computing time, a fourth subsystem will probably have
started computing F 1 (D2) , and subsystem A will have completed F 1 (D1) and moved another
function or another data word, e.g. F 1 (D2). As soon as the required number of copies of
F 1 (D1) have been computed, this data will be voted on and transferred to the certified data
track. Once it is on the certified data track, it is available for subsystems to begin the
computation of F 2 (F 1 (D1)). This general process will continue until all sets of data have
been channeled through all the functions.
C. SUBSYSTEM FUNCTIONAL CAPABILITIES
1. Typical Subsystem Operational Capabilities
The exact functional capabilities of the individual subsystems have not yet been de-
fined. It has been established, however, that each subsystem will probably have to have the
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Figure 5-3. Simplified Memory Arrangement
capability to perform three or more of the following types of functions:
a. Read In
b. Read Out
c. Add
d. Subtract
e. Compare
f. Delay (or Transfer)
g. Interpret
The first four instructions are self explanatory. The next instruction, COMPARE,
enables the programmer to introduce conditional branching into the program, and could also
be designed to implement voting. The DELAY instruction enables the transfer of information --
a choice of addresses.
The INTERPRET instruction tells the processing unit what function to perform,
apart from instructions 1 - 6. The function may be in the form of a subroutine on another
track, in which case the INTERPRET instruction is a transfer of control. The INTERPRET
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instruction may also command functions permanently programmed into each unit, such as
"multiply" and "divide".
2. Voting Implementation Alternatives
The operation of a system employing subsystem redundancy requires the use of re-
storing or voting networks to determine the best estimate of a signal based on the examination
of several nominally identical copies of the signal. In most serially operated digital systems,
the voting network takes the form of gates whose instantaneous output states conform to the
existing states of the majority of their inputs. Because of the serial generation of signals,
the voting is performed on "bit-by-bit" basis. In the systems proposed here, the voting will
be performed on a "word"-by-"word" basis in any one of the number of ways which are de-
scribed in Section E below.
The point of interest here is that the voting function may be implemented in either
of two ways. A set of special subsystems may be added to the system to perform the function
for all of the data generated by the other systems, or performing the vote function may be one
of the normal activities of all or a subset of the computational subsystems. At this point in
the development, it is not apparent which of these two alternatives is best. It is, in fact,
highly probable that the choice of voting implementation will depend on whether the system is
always used in the redundant mode of operation, upon the relative speed of the voting process
compared to the average computational speed, and upon the complexity of the specific voting
function being used.
D. VOTING SCHEME ALTERNATIVES
Many methods of voting are easily implemented using a memory medium. One very
economical method is to produce only two copies of each function. These are compared by
the voter and, if there is agreement, the result entered in the certified date list. When dis-
agreement occurs a third copy is produced and a normal 'two out of three' vote is taken. Since
disagreement is infrequent, most of the functions need only be duplicated, which means that
with a given number of subsystems there is about a fifty percent increase in processing
capability.
Another type of voting to consider is adaptive. This results in the best 'decision' when
there are more than three copies of a result. When working on a bit-by-bit basis the vote in
the ideal case is found by associating a weight, w = log , with each subsystem (or with
each function of each subsystem) where p is the probability of failure of that unit. Hence, w
increases if the subsystem is reliable and decreases when the subsystem makes frequent
errors. A similar law would apply when comparing 'words' rather than 'bits'.
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Althoughthechoiceof schemesfor comparingdatabit-by-bit is fairly limited, therange
oftechniquesfor theanalysisandcomparisonof datawordsis quitebroad. Thefinal choice
of optimalvotingschemesfor this typesystemwill composea studyin itself to evaluatethe
trade-oilsin votingspeed,equipmentrequiredandvoteaccuracy.
E. OPERATIONALMODES
Infh_nr_rar]_nrrcapf_nn¢÷hn ._ ...... :---- Of *t. .... _."..... colltlnunication type systems
has been restricted to those systems operating in a redundant fashion. Although the primary
objective of this study did not include the investigation of new implementations of non-redundant
system, the technique which has evolved also offers potential advantages to the user of non-
redundant systems. This technique also facilitates using a single system alternately in re-
dundant and non-redundant modes or in a combination mode where only certain vital functions
are performed in the redundant mode. The desirability of this mode versatility is illustrated
by the following example.
Consider a typical set of computer applications on a space mission. Before launch the
computer may be used to check out all test points and report any failures. During launch the
computer, besides monitoring many test points, may be used for real time control of the
rocket motors and guidance etc. Later in the flight path, the computer may control the
guidance under direction from a ground base to set it accurately in course. During the major
part of the life of the computer, it will probably be used mainly for data monitoring, for pro-
cessing incoming data (from sensors on the spacecraft) and sending the statistics back to
ground. The need for highly reliable operation varies drastically during the course of the
mission. Moreover, when the computer becomes incapable of performing the processing for
all sensors, it is better for it to continue processing fewer sensors rather than none at all.
It is therefore preferable to have a computer system which gradually decreases in capability
due to failure of its components, than a computer with constant capability which at some point
fails completely.
The control of the operational mode of the computer can probably be made a part of the
stored program. As a result, the reliability of the system can actually be controlled by the
user of the equipment and only the upper limit on reliability is set by the equipment designer.
5-3. AREAS OF FUTURE STUDY
The objective of the study reported here has been to begin the investigation of the ad-
vantages, disadvantages and the feasibility of implementing redundant computing systems
whose individual subsystems communicate through a common medium. Although this ob-
jective has been achieved, a much more extensive study of the system design alternatives
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mustbecarriedoutbeforethenetbalanceof advantagesanddisadvantagescanbeevaluated
or beforesuchsystemscouldactuallybeimplemented.Somealternativeswhichshouldbe
consideredin detailaredescribedbelow.
1. TheComplexityof thesubsystems.It ispossibleto buildsubsystemswhichcan
performa largevarietyof complexfunctions.Bymerelyenteringa codewordfrom the
memory,thesybsystemmaychangefromperformingafunctionlike (sin2x) to performing
onelike (_f_). Withsuchsubsystems,theprogramonthemediumcouldbecomeverysimple.
At theotherextreme,thesubsystemscouldbeverysimpleandtheprogramonthemedium
verydetailed. Thelatterarrangementwouldprobablyleadto a lowercomponentcount,but
increasesthecomplexityof theprogrammingandthesizeof thestoragerequired.
2. TheAddressingaadProgramn_,ingof theSystem
Onemethodof programmingis to adda"tag" to eachsetof data,to identifythe
nextfunctionperformedonthatdata. Thisproceduremayrequirea searchfor databearing
corresponding'tags'. Underthoseconditions,aformof contentaddressablememoryis re-
quired. Hopefully,however,a moreconservativetypeof programmingwouldbepossible
wheretheaddressof therequireddatawouldbeknown.A thirdalternativetypeof pro-
grammingwouldbe 'list processing',whereeachinstructionwouldcontainthepositionof
thenextinstruction. Asa fourthalternative,thesubsystemsmayfollowapredetermined
sequenceof instructions,i.e. all thefunctionsit is to performundergivenconditionsare
determinecibytheprogrammer,whomust,therefore,foreseeall thepossibilities.
Theindividualsubsystemmayalsohaveits ownstoredprogram,inwhichcase
theprogrammercouldinitially programthefunctionsthatthesubsystemwouldperform. In
operationtheprogramstoredin thesubsystemwouldnotnormallybechanged.It mightnot
bedesirablefor all thesubsystemsto beabletoperformall thefunctions,but it wouldbe
desirableto beableto redistributethefunctionsamongthesubsystemswhenanotherproblem
is programmed.
3. TheMemoryHardware
Thesystemwhichhasbeendescribedindetailusesa drummemory. However,
a similar systemcouldbearrangedwithotherimplementationsof thememorymediumsuch
asa magneticcoreor magneticthinfilm storageunits. In sucha casethe mechanical
scanning(inherentin therotationof thedrum)wouldbereplacedbyelectronicscanning.In
manycasesthis latter typeof memorywouldberequiredto eliminatetheundesirable ffects
of usingmovingparts in a spacebornesystem. Thismoveto electronicallyscannedmemories
maynotbenecessaryas is shownbythefact thatmagneticdrumstoragehasbeensuccessfully
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usedinmanycomputers.Certainlythedrumhasmanyadvantagesincludinglargecapacity
andmediumaccesstime storageusingrelativelysimpleequipment.
In theultrareliablesystemdescribedhere, thereliability of thememoryunit
wouldbeasimportantasthatof thearithmeticandotherlogicalfunctions. Also, because
theconceptof usinga 'medium'is baseduponhavinga mediumwhichis simpleto address,
the implementationbycorestnrageandothermeansandtheconcomital_telectronicscanning
designmeritsseriousstudy. Alternativesolutionsalsoincludeopticaltechniques.The
opticaltechniqueswouldprovidetheelectricalisolationbetweenunitswhichis highlyde-
sirableandwhichis providedin thepresentsystemby mechanicalscanning.
4. Voting
Error correctingmethodsotherthanvotingshouldbeconsideredin this system.
Thesystemshouldlenditselfwell to error correctingcodes,theuseof specialtestproblems.
A combinationofvotingandcodingmightbethebestalternative. Theimplementationof the
votingis anareaof studyin itself. Assumingan-linevoter, eachprocessmustberepeated
n (andonlyn) times, andeachtimea differentsubsystemmustdotheprocess. A wayof
doingthishasalreadybeensuggested- havingthreeVoteTrackswitheachsubsystemre-
cordingits result ononeof thetracks. It will probablybenecessaryfor eachsubsystemto
indexits resultssothattheerroneousresultmaybeassociatedwiththesubsystemwhich
producedit andthesubsystemtreatedaccordingly.
5. FailedSubsystems
Whenafailedsubsystemhasbeenidentified,thequestionof whatto dowithit re-
mains. If a systemof adaptivevotingis beingused,thenthe 'weight'associatedwith thesub-
systemwouldbereduced. It is possiblethatalthoughthesubsystemfailed inoneof its
functionsit maystill beableto performtheremainderof its functionsreliably. Hence,it
is desirableto identifynotonlythesubsystembutalsothefunctionit performederroneously
andinhibitit from performingthatfunctionagain. It is this typeof arrangementwhichmakes
it difficultfor theprogrammerto foreseeall thepossibilitiesandindeed,to programroutines
for all thepossibilitiesweretheyforeseen. If however,thesubsystemscouldindependently
decidewhichfunctionstheyarestill capableof performingandchooseto dothosefunctions
whentheyarise in themainprogram,thenthemainprogramcanbecomparativelysimple.
6. SpecialFailureModes
It is possiblefor thesubsystemsto fail in manyways. Onewaywhichdeserves
particularconsiderationis whenthewrite headfails in sucha mannerasto eraseall the in-
formationona track or to write meaninglessinformation. Thefirst approachto solvingthis
5-10
problem would be to try to design a write head which is fail-safe. If the failure occurred
right at the head (by an electric short circuit, for example) then the normal switch to turn
the head off would probably be ineffective and it may be necessary to cut off the power to the
whole unit.
Another approach to solving this problem is to provide each unit with parallel
write heads on many tracks. If now one of theheadsfails, the particular track it is on is
considered a loss (or its weight is decreased - if we associate weights with tracks and carry
out a vote), and the unit it belongs to may still be used in conjunction with other tracks.
Using multiple tracks and associating voting weights with the tracks as well as the
units also overcomes the problem of a track becoming inferior because of dirt or scratches
eLc.
5-4. C ONC LUSIONS
This task has been an exploratory investigationof possible organizational structures of
systems which can easilybe reorganized to continue operation with a relativelyhigh per-
centage of failedcomponents. The investigationshave led to the formulation ofa general
type of computer organization which fulfills the objective of this task. The computer is a
multiprocessor in which each subsystem communicates with all other subsystems through a
common memory medium. The medium also stores any information which each subsystem
would normally contain in any storage which was not controlled by the inputs. Subsystem
outputs are stored (and voted on) in the medium.
The many advantages of such an organization provide convincing evidence that the
organization merits further study. These advantages may be summarized as:
1. High Subsystem Mobility
a. The prime advantage is that this type system offers one means for realizing
the potential benefits of failure-responsive systems. Indeed, in the system where each sub-
system can perform all the functions, the maximum "mobility" of the subsystems has been
achieved because every subsystem may replace any other subsystem as the failure pattern
occurs. In this system two of the main restrictions on mobility have been removed. The
first restriction is that all subsystems perform the same function. Subsystems are proposed
which have the capability to change function when they change position. As a result the
homogeneity difficulties inherent in fixed function subsystems do not arise. The second
major obstacle to mobility occurs when a subsystem contains a fixed memory - i.e. a
memory not set up within a few cycles by the data stream. Subsystems which are otherwise
identical but which contain different information in their memory are not interchangeable.
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However, using a memory medium, memory which was formerly a part of the subsystem is
now a part of the medium. Any subsystem may now associate itself with the part of the
medium containing this memory and perform in this position just as well as any other sub-
system.
b. Graceful Degradation
Graceful degradation of the system performance is inherently available in the
system. This concept of graceful degradation assumes that the system is not used for only
one purpose at a fixed data rate. In that case a definite capability would be required. Having
greater capability would be wasteful, and having less constitutes complete failure.
The system proposed has this desirable property. For example, the system
may first have twenty subsystems. If each subsystem is identical - can accomplish all the
functions, then eighteen subsystems can fail (assuming two out of three voting) and the com-
puter will still be able to do everything that was possible initially, but take ten times as long
to do the same task.
c. Optimal Non-Redundant Operation
One of the most common objections to redundant systems is that they use three
times the number of components without increasing computer capability. On the other hand,
it may be desirable to operate three computers in parallel when failure is very expensive.
As this implies, having three individual computers gives one a choice between capability and
reliability. This choice is available in an even more useful form with the medium system. By
reprogramming the system the subsystems may do each process only once, increasing the
power of the computer by a factor of two or three. This option may be very desirable for
ground testing equipment before take off, or in any mode where reliability is not as important
as speed.
Operation in the non-redundant mode is not alien to the system design and
interleaving non-redundant and redundant operation is quite possible. This may be done
even in the same computation if certain parts are not as significant as others.
d. Asynchronous Operation of Subsystems
The units in a processing system with memory may operate asynchronously.
This relieves the programmer of timing problems and increases the efficiency of computation,
since subsystems need not wait for each other. As this implies, the memory serves both as
a central medium and as a buffer store for each subsystem.
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e. EfficientUseof TimeSharedSubsystems
Becausethesubsystemsarenotrestrictedto a singlefunctionalocation,but
rathertheyperformthenextina sequenceof functionsastheyareneeded,thesubsystems
maybesharedbetweendifferentproblems. Priority interruptis effectedbyplacingthe
interruptingroutinewithinthemainprogram. Thesubsystemsoperateinparalleli hence,
eachsubsystemis usedto its full capacity.
A newdevelopmentprogramsuchasthis createsmanynewstudyareas.One
approachto developingtheorganizationin moredetailwouldbeto assumesomeproperties
for thesubsystemsandthenwrite theprogramsto makethemfunctionasdesired. Thiscon-
figurationcouldthenbesimulatedona generalpurposedigitalcomputer.Suchaprocedure
wouldinsurethatrealistic solutionsarefoundin eachproblemarea.
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I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Need for High System Reliability
Electronic digital data processing systems have become an integral part of the
modern world. These systems are commonly used to perform tasks which were thought
unachievable only a decade ago. The great computational capabilities and operating
speeds of today's data processors have usually been obtained at the cost of extremely
high equipment complexity. This complexity naturally results in low system reliability.
This, in turn, limits the usefulness of the equipment to the extent that a paradoxical
situation threatens to emerge in which system capability is extremely high but it is
almost never available for use.
In addition to the problems caused by loss of operating time, high system com-
plexity and the necessity of frequent complicated repairs aggravate the problems of
supplying spare parts and properly trained maintenance personnel. Yhe_e prubi_m_
become increasingly troublesome as large systems are put into use at remote locations.
The natural environments for most military field and shipboard equipment are sufficiently
remote to make the logistics problems dominate over almost all other considerations.
The limit in this area is reached by spaceborne equipment where logistics become
virtually impossible.
The necessity for high system reliability may also be dictated by the vital nature
of the system functions as well as by an interest in maximizing system usefulness or
minimizing liaison problems. Quite often control systems, for example, are relatively
simply in comparison to large scale data processing systems, but their continuous opera-
tion may be of vital necessity for the safety and security of an individual or a nation.
The list of applications of this class includes space vehicle "on-board" controls systems,
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atomicreactor controls, missile guidanceanddestructsystems,andsecurecommuni- '
cationssystems.
!. ConservativeDesign
B. Methodsof IncreasingSystemReliability
Oneof thefirst methodsthat designengineerssuccessfullyusedto increasesys-
tem reliability wasthat of deratingelectroniccomponents.Usingthis procedure, cir-
cuits aredesignedwith componentsof muchgreater powerandvoltagerating thanthe
specificcircuit applicationsrequire. In operation,thesecomponentsare subjectto such
low thermal andelectrical stress that their expectedlife approaches"shelf-life". This
methodhasprovedto bea relatively cheapandeffectivemeansfor increasingaverage
systemlife.
2. Hyper-reliable Components
A secondmethod,whichhasbeenequallysuccessful,involvestheuseof special
manufacturingproceduresto producemore reliable components.This methodemploys
refinedfabricationtechniquesanda supplementaryprogramfor individualcomponent
testing. Thetestingprogramis usedto monitor various characteristics of the com-
ponentsduringthe manufacturingproceduresuchthat anydefectscanbedetectedbefore
theproductreachestheconsumer. This approachto achievinghigh systemreliability
hasbeenchampionedby the Air Force's MinutemanMissile program. Althoughsignifi-
cant reductionsin componentfailure rates havebeenrealized throughthe useof this
technique,theeffort appearsto be reachinga point of diminishingreturns whereeach
level of improvementis becomingmore andmore costly to achieve.
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3. Coding
An entirely different approach to the problem of achieving high reliability has been
found in the use of coded signals. This approach is useful in binary data transmission
and storage systems where the primary interest is that of maintaining the accuracy of
existing information. In using this technique, the information to be transmitted or stored
is broken up into sections called "words". Each of the words is subsequently analyzed
to determine one or more of its characteristics. For example, a characteristic which
is commonly of interest is the number of ones appearing in the binary word. The results
of the analysis are converted to binary data, and this latter data is then combined with
the original word to form a complete message unit. Depending on the complexity of the
code, single or multiple error detection or correction can be performed when the
message unit is decoded following transmission or storage.
In general, this technique is not applicable to systems which perform any function
other than data transmission or storage. This limitation exists because any arithmetic
or similar function destroys the integrity of the code by altering the message units.
4. Redundant Equipment
Several methods for achieving high system reliability through the use of redundant
equipment have also been used. One relatively simple technique has been used for
decades in the form of stand-by facilities. Using this method, auxiliary equipment is
switched into use in the event of primary equipment failure. Most implementations of
this method are extremely costly relative to the failure protection which they provide,
For example, one unmaintained primary system and an unmaintained duplicate standby
can only absorb one failure in each system before they both become inoperative and the
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andthesystemfunctionis lost. Usingmoresophisticatedtechniques,however, it is not
unreasonableto expectthat equipmentwhichis replicatedthreeor four times might
absorbseveraldozenfailures beforethesystemfunctionis lost.
Thefollowingsectiondescribesthebasic typesof redundancytechniqueswhich
havebeendeveloped.Themnr_ f_n,,hl,_nrn,_ ,-1_,_ .... _.... ,___A , ........
cluded to provide a basis for the study reported in the remainder of this thesis.
C. Redundancy Techniques
The new techniques which have been developed for systematically introducing
redundant equipment into data processing systems can be separated into two general
classes: (1) component replication; (2) subsystem replication. It has been shown that
the redundant equipment employed in a fixed system configuration is most effective when
the system is divided into the smallest divisible units. Because the individual circuit
components usually represent such units, this implies that component redundancy is the
most efficient technique which can be employed. In attempting to implement redundant
systems of this type, however, several problems immediately arise which suggest that
this form of redundancy is not always compatible with other system design considerations.
Component redundancy is applied by placing several replicas of an electronic
component in a series or a parallel configuration or some combination of the two.
Examples of each type configuration is shown in figure 1. These configurations are often
much more reliable than a single non-redundant component because more than one com-
ponent must fail into its detrimental mode (i. e., open or short) before the circuit func-
tion of the component is completely lost, and the system fails. For example, if a
certain type diode always fails to a short mode, placing two or more of them in series
as shown in figure la will protect the circuit from failure until all of the diodes in the
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chainfail. A similar protection is providedagainstopencircuits byparalleltngcomponents
(figure lb) or against either mode through the use of quads (figure lc) or larger Hammock
Networks (figure ld).
It is apparent that such a technique for introducing redundancy cannot be applied
to components where the actual values of the components are critical to the operation of
the circuit. The failure of individual components in these configurations may easily
change the impedance of the network by fifty per cent. Although most digital circuits
are not particularly critical to impedance changes, many types of circuit applications
are sensitive to changes of this magnitude.
In applying this type of redundancy, the assumption is made that the failure of one
component is virtually independent of the operation of any other components. In systems
using thin film or molecular-electronic circuits, it has been found that failures of corn-
ponents deposited on the same inactive base or included in the same semiconductor block
are highly correlated. This means that in order to achieve even a rough approximation
a) SERIES REDUNDANT COMPONENTS
O
I
I I
o
b)PARALLEL REDUNDANT COMPONENTS
Figure 1.
o
c) QUADDED REDUNDANT COMPONENTS
d) HAMMOCK NETWORK OF REDUNDANT
COMPONENTS
Redundant Component Configurations
o
o
.--.O
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to componentindependence,componentsin the sameredundantnetworkwouldhaveto be
depositedondifferentbasesor blocks andconnectedtogetherwith additionalwiring. The
unreliability of interconnectionsbetweenthesecircuits wouldusuallyoffset thegains
soughtthroughredundancy;therefore, a different classof techniquesmustbeusedfor
introducingredundancyinto mostmicromintaturizedcire_,its.
Thesecondclassof techniques,subsystemreplication, canbesubdividedinto two
significantlydifferent subclasses. In thefirst of these, the "senseandswitch" subclass,
twoor morenominallyidentical replicasof a subsystemare monitoredandcontrolledby
a monitorandcontrol network. Basedonsomepredeterminedoperationalcriteria the
networklocks theoutputof thestage1 to the output of one of the subsystem replicas until
a failure in that subsystem is sensed by the monitoring circuitry. At this time the con-
trol portion of the network attempts to switch the stage output to a working replica if one
is available.
Although this technique is particularly useful in analog systems, it is very difficult
to calculate the quality of a digital signal without comparing it to another nominally
identical signal. Because of this, the sensing circuits must be very elaborate to capital-
ize on the advantage of one out of (n) replica operation. This is troublesome because
this type operation is the major advantage derived from techniques of this subclass.
The second subclass of techniques for this type of implementation of redundant
systems might be called the "voted" techniques. Of the several techniques in this sub-
class, the "multiple-line" methodof implementation appears to be the best. Figure 2b
shows basic topological characteristics of a segment of a multiple-line system. A non-
redundant version of this equipment would consist of three single input, single output
subsystems connected in series as shown in figure 2a. To form the redundant version
A "stage" consists of all of the subsystem replicas and any associated circuitry
required to provide a redundant replacement for a subsystem in a non-redundant
system.
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O. NON-REDUNDANT SYSTEM
b. MULTIPLE-LINE REDUNDANT SYSTEM
Figure 2. A segment of an Example System
of the equipment, each subsystem has been replicated twice and voting circuits (or
voters) have been inserted between the sets of subsystems. The use of three subsystems
to replace one from the non-redundant version results in an "order-three" system.
Similarly, the use of five to replace one would result in an "order five" system. The
voters are usually majority logic gates. The voters may, however, be designed to vote
on some alternate threshold level. This would be done if information were available to
indicate that the generation of erroneous ones is much more likely than the generation of
erroneous zeros or vice versa. The replication of the voters is necessary to prevent
system failure because of single failures in the voters themselves.
Several investigation teams (1), (2), (3), (4)* have studied this particular type of
redundancy and found it to be applicable to a broad range of digital systems. Under the
name s of "Multiple-line, Majority- Voted Redundancy" and "Triple- Modular Redundancy"
* Parenthetical references placed superior to the line of text refer to the
bibliography.
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andpossiblyothers, it is currently beingconsideredby variousgroupsfor inclusion
in thedesignof thedigital portionsof spaceborne quipmentassociatedwith several
projectsincludingRangerandSaturn.
Theprimary disadvantageof systemsof this typeis that theyare vulnerableto
certainimprobablebut destructivefailure patternswhichmaydisable the system while
most of the redundant equipment is still operational. One of these patterns will occur
anytime two of the first few component failures happen to occur in different replicas of
the same stage of an order-three system.
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• II. THEPURPOSEOF THISTHESIS
Thetechniquesdescribedaboveprovideavariety of meansfor employingredundant
equipmento increasethe reliability of electronicdigital systems. Althoughthese
techniquesare effectivein accomplishingthe desiredincreases, theydonotmakeas
efficientuseof the redundantequipmentas wouldseempossible.
In this thesis, theauthorproposesto presenttheconceptof a newtechniquewhich
theauthorhasdevelopedfor moreefficiently usingredundantequipmentto increasethe
reiiabili_y of oneclassof ...... ' .... *^_
authorproposesto showthat this techniqueis, in fact, moreefficient thanthecomparable
existingtechnique. Thecomparisonof thenewandthe old techniqueswill be made
throughtheuseof results obtainedfrom a computersimulationprogramwhichtheauthor
hasdevelopedfor this specific purpose.
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III. PREVIOUS WORK IN THIS AREA
BY OTHER INVESTIGATORS
The use of redundant equipment has interested a relatively large number of investi-
gators in both academic and industrial environments. The publications which have been
produced by these investigators are too numerous to list here; however, a bibliography
which lists over one hundred of these publications was published by P.A. Jensen (5) in
1962. The majority of this work has been concentrated on the analysis and development
of fixed redundancy techniques.
Only a very few investigators seem to have seriously considered systems which
are in any way similar to those of interest in this investigation. The most notable work
on this latter subject appears to have been done by E.J. Kletsky (6) and S. Seshu, (7) at
Syracuse University Research Institute and L. Lofgren (8), (9) at the University of
Illinois Electrical Engineering Research Laboratories. Kletsky and Seshu worked as a
team under a Navy contract while Lofgren simultaneously conducted an independent study
for the Air Force. Both Lofgren and Kletsky were interested in developing mathematical
models which would describe the expected life of systems that draw up spares from a
common '_0oo1" to perform any necessary subsystem repairs. Although Lofgren's work
is generally more abstract than Kletsky's, neither of them was particularly concerned
about the problems of implementing such systems. In one paper, however, Lofgren did
propose a fluid flow technique for performing the subsystem replacement function. This
technique is itself fraught with many problems, but it certainly represents an ingenious
contribution to the art. At least one other investigator, R.R. Landers (10) has attempted
to extend the fluid flow technique to a more nearly realizable state.
Seshu suggested two possible techniques for implementing systems of the general
type that Kletsky was studying. In considering implementation, he immediately recog-
nized the problem associated with detecting errors in systems employing a non-redundant
on-line structure supplemented by a pool of spares. He proposed two feasible
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implementationtechniques. In onetechnique,hesuggestedthat a central controller be
constructedto monitor theremainderof the systemandto perform anynecessarysub-
systemreplacements. As analternative, heproposedto havea ring of subsystemswith
eachsubsystemmonitoringandcontrollingoneof its neighbors.
Thesystemorganizationsdescribedin this paperhavethesamegeneralobjective,
i. e., longsystemlife, asthe self-repairing systemswhichwere consideredby Kletsky,
Seshu,andLofgren. Theorganizationalstructureof thesystemsdescribedhere, how-
ever, are muchmorecloselyrelatedto presentlypracticabledigital systemsthanare
J.I-_
those of the limiting cases considered by u_ above ,_u_.vro._'-'"__ _,_........ v._ +h_..._,_ff,_,-,_nr,__..._.....
between the organizational structures, this new work does not appear to be an extension
of any of the other author's work.
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IV. FAILURE RESPONSIVE SYSTEM ORGANIZATIONS
A. The General Concept
A "failure responsive system" is a redundant system which has the capability to
partially reorganize itself to combat the detrimental effects of internal subsystem fail-
ures. Before any subsystems have failed, failure responsive systems closely resemble
the multiple-line redundant systems which have been previously described. Within these
systems each subsystem is also replicated several times, and each replica in each stage
is supplied with a set of the inputs associated with the stage. The outputs are fed into a
switching network and used to determine the best estimate of the correct stage output
in a manner similar to the voting circuits of the multiple-line systems. These systems
resemble the multiple-line systems until one of the stages experiences .multiple subsys-
tem failures. When this condition occurs, the switching network for that stage signals
for a partial system reorganization. This reorganization consists of the elimination of
the failed subsystems, and the functional movement of other subsystems through the switch-
ing of their input and output connections. The result is the restoration of the system to
an operational state. This process is continued as long as enough subsystems remain
operational so that the reorganization action can effect the necessary restoration. It
should be noted that the reorganization should not change the functional operation of the
system. It only changes the distribution of the redundant subsystem replicas. As
this statement implies, the subsystems which take part in the reorganizations are func-
tionally identical so that any one can be substituted for any other one.
As an example of a typical series of operations, the reorganization actions of one
system as it would respond to one particular failure pattern, will be considered. The
system which will be considered is presented by the pattern of blocks shown in figure 3.
This pattern of blocks represents a seven stage, order three, failure responsive system.
The non-redundant version of this seven stage system would be similar to the three stage
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Figure 3. Example Failure Pattern
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system illustrated in figure 2a. In this case and in the figures which follow, the blocks
in the diagram represent individual subsystems. The physical position of the blocks re-
present the relative functional positions of subsystems within an electronic system. It
should also be noted that the peripheral switching circuits required to implement the
various systems have not been shown.
Referring to the letter code shown in figure 3a, the following series of subsystem
failures are assumed to have occurred: F, M, T, E, L. Note that this series includes all
of the subsystems enclosed by the dashed lines in figure 3a. Using a preprogrammed
response strategy, the system would react to this pattern of failures in the following
m anne r:
1. When F failed, its output would be permanently turned off. No other action
would be taken. (See figure 3b.)
2. When M failed, the ambiguity caused by the failure of one of two nominally
identical subsystems, M and T, will cause one of the working subsystems from
another stage to be switched to stage 6. In this case, subsystem E will be
moved up one stage. With E and T now properly performing the function of
stage 6, the ambiguity existing between M and T is resolved and M is turned
off. (See figure 3c.)
3. When subsystem T fails, an identical procedure will be used to call K to stage
6. Again the ambiguity existing between working subsystem E and failed sub-
system T will be resolved, and T will also be turned off. (See figure 3d. )
4. When E fails, processor Q will be moved to stage 6 and again the system will
be restored to operation. (See figure 3e.)
5. The subsequent failure of L, will result in subsystem P being moved to stage 5.
This will restore the stage and the system to operation. (See figure 3f.)
This example was specifically chosen to illustrate the conceivable range of variation
in response strategies as well as the potential power of the failure responsive technique.
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The first of these two is evident. For example, although a definite response strategy
was employed in the above example, it is not necessarily obvious to the reader what the
strategy was, even after observing the effect of several failures in the same general
location. As for the second item, it is obvious that the system would have failed after
the third failure and quite probably after the second failure if the multiple-line majority
voted technique were still being employed. With the failure responsive reorganization
capability, however, the system has withstood five consecutive failures in a tightly
grouped pattern without suffering system failure.
B. The Specific Organizational Objectives
One of the primary objectives of this study has been to develop a set of design rules
for failure responsive systems. These rules are intended to serve as guidelines for
facilitating system designs which will make very effective use of the redundant equipment,
subject to switching network unreliability and various instantaneous failure masking re-
quirements 2. To establish a meaningful set of rules, a wide variety of feasible response
strategy characteristics had to be considered to aetermine which _h,t_actel i_tic_ "xcrc
necessary, which were only desirable and which were undesirable. These characteristics
include the following:
1.
.
.
The number of replacements which should be available to any one stage. (The
assumption is made that the addition of replacements results in an addition to
the peripheral switching circuitry. )
The pattern for specifying which subsystems should be used as the replacements
for any particular stage and the order in which they should be called.
The use of fractional order of redundancy, i.e. not every stage being the same
order in the initial state.
"Instantaneous failure masking" means that a subsystem failure in any stage is
completely masked by that stage so that no errors propagate through the system
during the time the system is reorganizing itself to eliminate the failed subsystem.
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4. The use of minimum order of redundancy to be maintained at a stage from which "
a failed stage would like to take a replacement.
5. The capability of a vulnerable stage to override the minimum of number (4) in
the event no replacement is otherwise available.
6. The capability of a single subsystem to make more than one change of location.
These and other response strategy characteristics have been considered during
The relative importance and desirability of all of them are reflected in thethis study.
conclusions presented in section IX.
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V. ANALYSIS METHODS
To evaluate failure responsive systems and compare the effectiveness of various
response strategies, a method had to be found for determining the reliability of these
systems. In the case of multiple-line redundancy in which the functional locations are
static, various analytical techniques have been used to express reliability. The problems
presented in the following paragraphs indicate that the techniques used for analyzing fixed
redundant systems are not generally amenable to failure responsive systems.
Before proceeding with the description of the problems involved in applying
analytical techniques to failure responsive systems, it should be noted that all of the
systems considered will be limited to those of simple unilateral signal flow with single
inputs and single outputs at each subsystem. It is also assumed that all stages are
identical; therefore, all stage reliabilities are equal. Although such systems are
obviously idealistically simple, any more realistic modifications in the models would
only serve to complicate the existing problem or increase the overall number of problems.
A. The "Brute Force" Method
As stated above, the assumption has been made that all stages are identical. This
statement implies that the system reliability,Rs, can be expressed as
Rs = (RsT)N (i)
where RST = the stage reliability,
N = the number of stages in the system.
Because N is always known, the only significantproblem is the determination of RST.
For a system employing fixed redundancy, this problem is easily solved by enumerating
the number of failure patterns which can exist within the stage and stillpermit stage
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operation. Thecomputationis completedby summingtheprobabilities that eachof these
patternswill exist. For example, thereliability of a stagein anorder-three, majority-
votedmultiple line systemis givenby:
R : (e- kt)3 + 3 (e- k_2 (1- e- kt) (2)3
This problem is not so easily solved in the case of failure responsive systems.
The mobility of the subsystems in these systems suggests that the enumeration of opera-
ting states must be performed on a complete system basis rather than be restricted to
an individual stage. This approach is complicated by the fact that many response
strategies are sensitive to the order in which failures occur as well as the particular
locations of the failures. The number of possible operating states and the permutations
of failure orders combine to make the overall reliability computation process too lengthy
for practical use.
B. The Markov Chain Method
The changes in system operating states caused by subsystem failures may be re-
garded as transitions between states in a Markov chain. The formulation of this reliability
analysis problem as a Markov chain automatically provides a group of solution methods
which are not otherwise available.
Before proceeding with the analysis, however, it would seem wise to consider the
size of the Markov transition matrix which would be required for the systems of interest.
A typical system might have as many as a hundred or more stages in it, but to be con-
servative a ten-stage system will be used as an example. The number of possible opera-
tional states of a ten stage order three system is 230 or 1,073,741,824. This assumes
that each of the 30 subsystems is either working correctly or catastrophically failed.
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The assumption is made that cancelling errors do not occur and the voting
circuitry is perfectly reliable.
Thenumberof entries in the transitional matrix for this systemwouldbe (230)2..It is
obviousat this point, that evenif specialtechniquescouldbe foundto eliminate 95%of
theseentries from consideration,the matrix wouldstill be toobig to handleconveniently,
evenusinga large, highspeedcomputerto perform the computations.
C. TheMinimal CutsTechniques
A techniquefor determiningthelower boundon the reliability of redundantsystems
hasbeendevelopedby EsaryandProschan(11) This .......... _.... a_onth_ _×istence
of "coherent" systems and definable sets of "minimal cuts". These terms have been
precisely defined by Esary and Proschan in the following manner: A system is "coherent"
when it fulfills the following conditions:
(1) A system which has failed because of a pattern of component failures
existing within the system would not begin working again upon the occurrence
of any additional failures.
(2) A system which is working in the presence of a set of component failures
should not stop working if any of the failed components is repaired or replaced.
(3) A system should work when all of its components are working.
(4) A system should fail when all of its components are failed.
A "cut" is a set of components whose simultaneous failures are sufficient to cause
system failure regardless of the operational state of the other system components. (A
system will usually contain a relatively large number of cuts with many components
appearing in more than one cut.) A "minimal cut" is defined as any cut in which there
exists no subset of components whose combined failures would cause system failure.
Failure responsive systems meet all of the conditions required of coherent systems.
They do not, however, always meet the condition of definable minimal cuts. The sensi-
tivity of many of the response strategies to the order in which failures occur destroys
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the conceptof a minimal cut. Figures 4aandb showsthe systemwhich illustrates this
point. In theexamplethe responsestrategyallowsonly the subsystemsonthe toprow to
changelocation. Anyof thesemaymoveforward4 oneor twostagesif requiredby the
existingfailure pattern. If failures occur in theorder indicatedby the small circled
numbersin figure 4a, thesystemwill remain operationalwith themoveablesubsystem
from stageChavingshifted to stageD. If howeverthefailures occur in the order shown
in figure 4b, thesystemfails becauseanunresolvableambiguityexists in stageC. It is
apparentfrom this example,that cuts cannotalwaysbe identifiedby thepatternof
failures existingat anyparticular time. This difficulty, combinedwith the complex
problemof enumeratingall the minimal cuts whichcanbe identified, virtually prohibits
the useof this analytical techniquefor estimatingthereliability of failure responsive
systems.
®
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D D V]
STAGE A B C D
O. NON-CRITICAL ORDER
®
I-1 I-I D
®
I-I F-1 I-1
A B C D
b. CRITICAL ORDER
Figure 4. Critical and Non-Critical Order of Failures
Stages A and D are assumed to be adjacent so that the moveable subsystem in stage D,
for example, can be moved to stages A or B.
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D. The Computer Simulation Method
The concept of physically modeling a large system and testing the response of the
model to gain knowledge of the true situation is a form of simulation that has been used
for centuries. Although in computer simulation no physical model is built, a functional
representation of a system to be tested is formed by a sequence of program statements.
These statements are used to specify all of the individual deterministic actions of the
system. Inputs and outputs to this model are presented to the computer in the form of
data rather than physical quantities. The response of the true system to various perturba-
tions in the input data is estimated by observing the response of the computer represe_n_ta-
tion just as if a physical model had been built.
Mathematicians almost always object to the use of either physical or computer
simulation because no rigorous proofs of the results can be given, and the system
response cannot be described by a group of neat, closed-form expressions. Because
these are valid objections, simulation analysis is usually used only for treating very
iar_ co_plcx _y_tems wh_re the number of variables in the problem prohibits the use
of more standard mathematical modeling techniques, or where the cost of exercising
the real system is too high. In the case of failure responsive systems, the variety of
characteristics inherent in the response strategies are difficult to model accurately in a
mathematical expression. However, such systems can be easily handled by a computer
simulation program.
The inputs to this particular program are in the form of response strategy constants,
subsystem failure rates and random numbers. The random numbers are correlated with
individual subsystems to represent random failures. After the simulation of several
hundred input failure patterns, the program output is used to estimate system reliability.
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VI. THE COMPUTER SIMULATION PROGRAM
A. The Operational Principles of the Program
The topography of a system is modeled in the computer simulation program by an
array of stored data. These data can be roughly divided into two sets. The first set con-
tains information which specifies the operating state or the characteristics of individual
subsystems. The second set contains information which determines the characteristics
of the overall system operation. Different system response strategies and other opera-
tional requirements are simulated by establishing, within the computer memory, the
appropriate initial values of each of the stored data words. In some cases these values
are read directly into the computer from an external source, while in other cases, the
data is generated by the computer operating under the command of special input control
constraints.
B. Individual Subsystem Information
i. Failure Location Intervals
The operation of the program is based on the assumption that subsystem failures
can be simulated by the computer in such a manner that they represent the way in which
actual failures would occur in operating systems. The main problem is to determine
which subsystem should be designated as failed when a subsystem failure is assumed to
have occurred at a particular time. In order to accurately represent the occurrence of
a failure inan operating system, the conditional probability of a subsystem's just having
failed, given that exactly one subsystem failure has just occurred, must be equal to the
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same conditional probability that would apply to the subsystems in a comparable operating
system. It is shown in the Appendix that this conditional probability is given by the simple
expression:
)'i
P (i11) - L (3)
i=l
where i refers to the ith subsystem; ), i is the failure rate of the ith subsystem and L is
t_he total number of subsystems which were operational before the occurrence of the
present failure.
Randomly located subsystem failures are generated by the simulation program,
subject to the above conditional probability, in the following manner. The conditional
probability of failure associated with each subsystem is computed according to equation
(3). The interval of numbers between zero (0) and one (1) is then divided into L subinter-
vals with the length of each subinterval being directly proportional to conditional probability
of failure of one subsystem. The assignment of one submterwti to each zubsyst_m results
in the unique association of every number in the zero (0) to one (1) interval with exactly
one subsystem. To locate a simulated failure, the computer draws a random number
from a population which is uniformly distributed over this same zero (0) to one (1) range.
The random number thus selected must fall into one of the subintervals associated with
one of the subsystems. The computer locates this subsystem and designates it as failed.
In performing this operation, the computer first reads in the failure rates of the
subsystems. It then uses the failure rates to determine the conditional probabilities of
failure to be associated with the subsystems, and corresponding intervals of numbers.
The upper and lower bounds on the intervals then become a part of the stored data.
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2. SpaceLists
Oneof themajor differencesbetweenthe responsestrategiesis thesequencein
whichsubsystemsare calledto aid thefailed or, in somecases,vulnerablestages. One
of theoutstandingfeaturesof this computerprogramis thesimple mannerin whichan
almusiunlimitedvariety of sequencescanbeset up.
Aspart of the initialization procedure,an identificationnumberis assignedto each
subsystem. Thesequenceof subsystemsto becalledto aid anyparticular stageis
establishedby simply readinginto thecomputermemorya list of identificationnumbers.
Theorder of thenumberscombineswith their actualvalueto precisely specifythe desired
5sequence. Thelist of identificationnumbersis referred to asa "spare list". (This
techniquealso permits thetestingof randomresponsestrategiesby the insertion of ran-
domnumbersparelists.)
3. OtherStoredData
In additionto the informationconcerningrandomnumberinterval boundsandsub-
systemsparelists, a variety of other information is stored in the computermemory.
This informationis usedto specifythe generalcharacteristics of theresponsestrategy
beingtestedandto control manyof theperipheral programoperations.Figures 5aand5b
illustrate a typical exampleof the generalstrategy characteristics whichare specified
in this manner. In bothcases,stagethreehasexperiencedonefailure andstagefour has
experiencedtwofailures. At this point, stagefour requiresaid. In bothcases, thefirst
It shouldbenotedthat theprogramis equippedwith a patternduplicatingoptionthat
permits a samplesparelist to be read in for onestageandthepattern reproduced
for all other stageswith all "spare" subsystemscomingfrom the samerelative
location.
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choiceof a replacementis subsystemA; thesecondchoiceis B. Thestored information
specifyingthe operationof thesystemin figure 5apermitsA to shiZtto stagefour, leaving
stagethree in a non-redundantstate. In contrast, theoperationof thesystemin figure 5b
restrains themovementof A becauseof thepreviousfailure in thesamecolumnandforces
B to aid stagefour.
An exampleof the peripheralprogramoperationscontrolledbythe remaining
variables is the outputformat. Theinformationwhichis printedoutby the simulation
programcanbemanipulatedsothat details of the individualsimulatedfailure patterns
are availablefor inspection. Conversely,theoutputmaybe rest_ictedto a brief summary
of thecombinedstatistical results of manyruns.
D
STAGE 1
n
DD[3D
2 5 4 5
O. ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN A
NON-REDUNDANT SYSTEM.
B[3V]A[3
DBi  D
1 2 5 4 5 STAGE
b ATTEMPTS TO MAINTAIN AT LEAST AN
ORDER TWO REDUNDANT SYSTEM.
Figure 5. Two Response Strategies
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C. The Detailed Operation of the Program
i. Data Storage
The portion of the data which concerns individual subsystem operation is organized
into the format of a three dimensional matrix. This matrix closely resembles the actual
form of the system being simulated because two of the dimensions correspond to the
number of stages and the order of redundancy of the base system. The third dimension
contains data words about the subsystems represented by the first two dimensions.
Figure 6a shows one such matrix which represents the typical system shown in figure 6b.
As shown in figure 6a, the first two words at each location specify the random number
interval bounds associated with that subsystem location. The third word specifies the
identification number of that location. The fourth word is non-zero only if the simulated
subsystem initially found at that location has moved or failed. If this word is non-zero,
it equals the number of moves or failures which have occurred in that column at the time
the particular subsystem moved or failed. The remaining data words in each matrix
location are members of the spare list, where the fifth word represents the first entry on
the list, the sixth word the second entry, and so forth.
The data which is stored outside this matrix applies to the overall system or pro-
gram operation. This data is simply stored as individual variable values and does not
form any sort of integrated data block.
2. The Simulation Procedure
After all the initial data concerning the system operation has been inserted into the
computer memory, the actual simulation phase of the program begins. Although this part
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Figure 6. A Typical System and Its Matrix Representation
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of the program is complicated in terms of computer instructions, it is relatively simple
in principle. A series of random numbers is chosen from a population uniformly distri-
buted between zero (0) and one (1). As each number is chosen, it is associated with one
of the simulated subsystems by locating the subsystem whose random number interval
contains the chosen number. The failure of the subsystem is noted by adding one (1) to
the previous number of failures observed in the stage to which this subsystem belongs
and storing the new number in the fourth position in the matrix at that subsystem location.
In addition, the random number interval bounds are set to zero (0), thus prohibiting mul-
tiple failures of any one subsystem.
After the subsystem failure has been recognized, the computer checks to see if the
stage which experienced the failure subsequently requires the aid of a replacement sub-
system. If the stage still meets all of the requirements imposed by all of the related
criteria, no further action is taken, and the next in the series of random numbers is
selected. If the stage requires aid, the program begins searching through the subsystems
whose identification numbers appear on the spare list of the previously failed or moved
6
block in the vulnerable stage.
The search is conducted by interrogating the possible spares in the order in which
their identitication numbers appear on this spare list and determining their availability.
This continues until the "repair" is made or it is determined that the repair cannot be
made. If the repair can be made, the data describing the subsystem to be moved is shift-
ed from its initial location to the location of the previous failure in the vulnerable stage.
Depending on the strategy being tested, the subsystem in its new location may lose all of
its remaining repair capability; it may retain its old capability, or it may assume the
The only case in which aid may be required by a stage which has not previously
experienced a failure or the loss of a subsystem to another stage is in systems
having unequal stage redundancy. The program then considers the low order
stages as having lost some subsystems.
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capabilityof thesubsystemwhich it replaced. If therepair cannotbemade,a checkis
madeto seeif thenumberof operatingsubsystemsremainingin the vulnerablestageis
twoor greater. If theansweris yes, thesimulationcontinueswith thedrawingof another
randomnumber. If theansweris no, it is assumedthat themost recentfailure hasre-
sultedin the occurrenceof anunresolvableambiguityin thevulnerablestage;therefore,
the systemhasfailed.
Theprocedureis continueduntil thesystemreachesthefailed state. At this point,
thetotal numberof subsystemfailures in thesystemis recorded, thematrix is reset to
theoriginal state, andthe entire procedurebeginsagain. Thercpetition of this procedure
severalhundredtimes producesstatistical informationwhichcanbeusedto construct
estimatesof thereliability versus time curvesof systemsusingtheresponsestrategy
beingtested. Theentire simulationprocedureis summarized by the flow chart in figure 7.
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Figure 7. Summary Flow Chart of Computer ,Program
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VII. SYSTEM EVALUATION
A. Methods For Estimating System Reliability Versus Time Curve
1. The Conditional Probability Method
The information obtained from the simulation procedure can be used to construct a
histogram which describes the relative observed frequency of system failures for any
given number of subsystem failures. Figure 8 shows an example of such a histogram.
The height of the lines f(x) in this histogram are determined by counting the number of
systems which were observed to fail with exactly x subsystem failures in the system and
dividing this number by the total number of system failures which were simulated. Thus,
the magnitude of these lines represent a statistical estimate of the probability that a
particular system will fail at the occurrence of exactly the xth subsystem failure.
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Figure 9 shows the cumulative curve which is formed by adding segments of the
above histogram according to the relationship
X
F (x) = _ f (x)
i=0
(4)
The magnitude of F(x) is an estimate of the conditional probability that a system has failed,
given that exactly x failures exist within the system.
to calculate the system reliability.
If the assumption is made that the failure rates
It is this probability that is needed
of all the subsystems are equal,
the probability of exactly x failures occurring in a system containing N subsystems can
be calculated from the expression
where,
N - >,t) x -P (x,t) : (X) (1-e (e kt)
N
(X) is the
N-x
symbol for x combinations of N items.
(5)
This probability can be combined with the estimated conditional probability of system
failure to produce an estimate of the overall system reliability.
the relationship
N
R(t) = _. F(x)
X=O
This can be done using
P (x, t). (6)
To apply this technique to non-homogeneous systems having more than one subsys-
tem failure rate, two alternative possibilities have been considered. By recording the
distribution of failures among the different types of subsystems, the individual lines
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shown on the histogram coula be suou[vLuvu'" ...... so **'_+,,,,_+*,,_,-.........rn_cmitudes_ represented the con-
ditional probability that system had failed, given that the system has absorbed x failures
of one type subsystem, y failures of another types subsystem, z failures of another and
so forth. To obtain meaningful estimates of each of the conditional probabilities which
can be defined in this manner, an unreasonably large total number of system failures
would have to be simulated.
A much simpler method, which is equally accurate for a limited number of samples 7,
8
has been used in this program. In this second method a weighted average of the various
subsystem failure rates is computed, and this number is substituted for the single failure
7 i.e., 500 to 1000
N
m.X.
8 _ _ l where m. is the number of subsystem subject to the failure rate k
/.w N i i"
i=1
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rate usedin the equationgivenabovefor computingthereliability of homogeneoussystems.
It hasbeenfoundexperimentallythat therandomerror introducedby thegenerationof
randomfailures usuallymasksoutcompletelyanyerror introducedby theuseof the
weightedaverage.
2. The Random Time Generation Method
Inaddition to the simulation of random failure patterns, the computer program can
be used to locate randomly in time the occurrence of each failure in a pattern. Ithas
been previously stated that each subsystem is subject to a constant failure rate. This
implies thatthe probability of continuous operation of all (N) subsystems in any system
from the time t= 0 is given by the expression
N
- t
i = 1 (7)R(t) = e
Conversely, the probability that the first subsystem failure will occur in the interval
of time zero to t is given by the expression
N
- _ kit
P(1 st) = 1 - R(t) = 1 - e i=l (8)
Using a relationship described by A. M. Mood, (12) a set of random numbers drawn
from a population uniformly distributed between zero and one can be transformed to a
similar set of random numbers belonging to any other distribution. For the case of the
exponential distribution of interest, this is accomplished by letting
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f (y) = 1
f(y) = o
-k s t
and y = G(t) = 1 -e where
for 0 _< y
elsewhere
N
S
=
<1
ki
(9)
(10)
(11)
Figure 10 shows this last relationship graphically.
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Figure 10. Uniform to G(y) Distribution Transformation
Using this relationship, a random number taken from a set of uniformly distributed
numbers is used to generate the time to the first subsystem failure with the correct
probability of picking a time from any increment along the time axis. By simply subtrac-
ting the failure rate of the first failed subsystem from the total failure rate k and
s
setting the time scale reference at the point of the first failure, a time between the first
and second failure can be determined in the same fashion. The sum of these two times
simulates the total system operating time up to that point.
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This process is repeated until the system withstands so many failures that it fails
to meet the system operational criteria. The occurrence of this event stops the procedure,
and the various system state change characteristics and the total operating time are re-
corded.
The record of total operating times can be directly used to estimate _ysLem reiia-
bility 9 versus time. This is done by ordering the individual operating times so that the
percentage of systems operating prior to any given time can be calculated. This percen-
tage is exactly the observed system reliability and may be used as an estimate of the true
system reliability. It should be noted that the observed system reliability is always con-
stant between observed system failure times, therefore, a discontinuous curve such as
that labeled "A" in figure 11 results from the unmodified use of this estimation procedure.
A much smoother curve can be obtained by interpolating intermediate values in the area
between the points.
Reliability, is defined here as the probability of continuous system operation over a
time interval zero (0) to (t) when it is known that the system was operating at time
zero (0).
1.000
)" 0.998,)-
- 0.996,
_1
_n 0.994"
-- 0.99_
.J
0.990
or
<,
Figure 11.
P I ! I !
TIME ----_
Comparison of Reliability Estimation Curves
A-36
3. Comparison of the Two Estimation Techniques
The reliability curves produced by both of these estimation techniques tend to be
more accurate in the central region of the curves where most system failures occur than
they are at either of the upper or lower extremeties. This situation exists because the
extreme regions are dominated by the few system failures which occur either with very
few subsystem failures or unusually many subsystem failures having been withstood.
No rigorous method for evaluating the two estimation techniques has been devised. For
the purpose of this study, the equation method of estimation has been chosen rather than
the time generation method. This choice was based on fact that the equation method
required no sophisticated method of interpolating between observed points to provide
meaningful estimates of the shape of the reliability curve in the high reliability region.
The curves shown in figure 11 may help clarify this point. In contrast to the five events
which control the shape of the step curve which naturally results from a sample of 500
cvcnt_ _ using the time _eneration technique, all the 500 events contribute in some amount
to the continuous curve produced by the equation technique.
B. Single-Valued Measures of Performance
The techniques which have been described above provide an estimate of system
reliability as a function of time. Because the comparison of the reliability of various
systems at every point in time is not practical or particularly meaningful, a method of
using the functional reliability estimate to generate a single-valued measure of perfor-
mance had to be found. The several possibilities which have been considered are des-
cribed below.
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1. MeanTime BeforeFailures
Themostpopularreliability measureappliedto non-redundantsystemsis the
"meantimebeforefailures" or "MTBF". TheMTBF is a quite usefulreliability measure
for non-redundantsystemsof this typebecausetheassociatedreliability cl,r-o_..... -._'_'_,,,,"'1ul^"
the exponentialform, havingtime constantswhichare inverselyproportionalto the MTBF
(seefigure 12). This measureis notas meaningfulfor failure responsivesystemswhose
reliability curvesvary in form. Figure 13showstwocurveswhichhaveapproximately
the sameMTBF's, but theyare obviouslynotequivalentsystems. It wouldseem, there-
fore, thata moreusefulmeasureshouldbe found.
2. SystemReliability at a SelectedTime
Thereliability of systemsat onepointin time is analternate measurethat deserves
consideration. This is byfar the easiestmeasureto compute,but it doeshavesomein-
herentdisadvantages.This measuremaysimply showthat onesystemis more reliable
thananothersystemat oneparticular point in time. If a situationsuchas theoneillus-
trated in figure 13exists, thesystemwhich is more reliable at t 1 maynotbe the more
desirableif themission is completedat t2. Similarly, twosystemsmayappearto be
nearly equivalentat the evaluationtime whentheydiffer greatly beforethe endof the
missiontime. Figure 14showsexamplesof the reliability curvesof two suchsystems.
Again, it wouldseemthata still better measureshouldbe found.
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3. Quantile Occurrence
The third available evaluator has not been extensively used in the past, but it seems
to overcome some of the disadvantages of the first two possibilities. This method uses
the time at which the system reliability fails below a pre-determined quantile as the
measure of evaluation. This measure is defined here as the "useful life". Figure 15
illustrates the method for the 0.90 quantile. In this case, the system characterized by
the 0.90 quantile occurring at t 2 is more desirable than the system with the quantile
occurring at t 1. This evaluator tends to overcome the problem inherent in the MTBF
evaluator because only the region of the curve which is of interest enters into the
evaluation. The problem of performing the evaluation only at a single point in time,
which is associated with the second evaluator is also solved because this third evaluator
is more sensitive to differences in system reliabilities in the high reliability region.
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The problem of accepting the wrong system because of curve crossover may be
virtually eliminated by confining the quantile selected as the criteria to the high reliability
region. Tins is _u_ ,t pa_tlcul_r!y _¢!gn_fi_nt restraint because the nature of the applica-
tions, which require the use of the sophisticated systems being considered here, will
require operation strictly in the high reliability region.
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VIII. SIMULATIONRESULTS "
Thesimulationstudyof responsestrategieshasbeenconductedin twophases.
In thefirst phasetheassumptionwasmadethat all of theperipheral error detectionand
switchingcircuitry requiredto implementthesystemswasperfectly reliable. In the
secondphase,this assumptionwasdroppedanda failure rate wasassociatedwith the
peripheralcircuitry as it is with the functionalsubsystems.
Althoughthefirst phaseeffort mayappearto becompletelysuperfluouswhencom-
paredto the secondphase,this is not thecasein practice. Thefirst phaseresults
indicatewhichresponsestrategiesare optimal if it is giventhat certain numbersof sub-
systemsappearon theindividualsparelists. This optimalstrategy information is inde-
pendentof thefailure rate of the switchingcircuitry. Thesecondphaseresults merely
showwhatthe lengthof thesparelist shouldbe, giventhe failure rate of the subsystems,
the minimumperipheral circuitry failure rate, andtheadditionalfailure rate whichmust
beaddedto the minimumto accountfor eachadditionto a sparelist.
In thepageswhichfollow, the resultswhichhavebeenobtainedduringbothphases
of the studyare described. To obtaineachpoint estimateof the reliability of systems
usinganyof theresponsestrategies, thesimulatedsystemshavebeensubjectedto five
hundredsets of failure patternsof sequentiallygeneratedsubsystemfailures. The
patternscontainthe minimumnumberof subsystemfailures required to causesystem
failure whenthesubsystemfailures occur in the order gene'rated.
Thecurvesshownbelowwere constructedby plotting thetime of occurrenceof the
0.90quantileonthe estimatedreliability curves. All the curves representsystemsof
twentystages, with thesubsystemfailure rate constantfor all stagesin all systems.
Theoriginal order of redundancyof the systemstestedis notedin the subsectiontitle.
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A. PhaseI Simulations
1. Order-ThreeSystems
a. Experiment I. In the first set of response strategies to be tested, the capability of a
subsystem to serve as a spare (or a replacement) was restricted to one subsystem in
each stage. The difference between the strategies stemmed from the pattern and the order
in which the subsystems having the spare capability appeared on the spare lists of the
individual stages. Three subsets of strategies were tested in the course of this experi-
ment. Figure 16 shows a sample spare list for one stage of each subset. The spare list
pattern is replicated for each stage, with the first and last stages assumed to be adjacent,
thus forming a closed "loop". The members of each subset all employ the same spare
list pattern. The individual members of a subset may be distinguished from each other
by the number of subsystems composing their associated spare lists.
The. obiect of this experiment was two fold. The first objective was to attempt to
verify the null hypothesis that the individual strategies were pair-wise equivalent, i.e.
that only the length of the spare lists was significant, and not the selection pattern. The
second objective was to determine the effect of allowing systems to have a "rescan"
capability. A system with rescan capability is one which first scans a spare list attempt-
ing to find and call up a replacement subsystem only from a stage which has experienced
no failures. If no replacements are found, it will "rescan" the list, searching for a sub-
system from any stage which has more than one operating subsystem.
Figures 17 and 18 shows the results of this experiment graphically by the curves.
It is apparent from these curves that the difference between spare list patterns (i. e.,
sequential, uniformly distributed, or alternating consecutive spare lists) is insignificant,
but that the rescan capability does have a significant effect.
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b. Experiment II. In the second set of strategies to be tested, the single spare per stage
restriction was released and any subsystem in a stage was allowed to perform as a spare
if the spare list lengths required. Figure 19 shows the "normal step" pattern which was
the basic pattern used for all the strategies in this class. The only difference in the
strategies was the length of the spare lists. The object of this experiment was to deter-
mine the effect produced by spreading the spare capability among more subsystems with
less movement capability.
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Curve 1 in figure 20 shows the results of this experiment relative to curve 2, the
curve for the consecutive lists from Experiment I. It can be seen from these curves that
the use of the step list results in a pronounced improvement over the consecutive list
system.
c. Experiment HI. The next set of response strategies to be tested can be described as
modifications of the step list strategies tested in Experiment II. Figure 21 shows an ex-
ample spare list pattern used by these strategies. The close resemblance to the step list
pattern is immediately apparent. The primary d'_ference between the two sets of strategies
is the distribution of the stages from which the spares are drawn. The strategies tested
in this experiment tend to reduce the mutual dependence of any two stages on replacement
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Figure 20. Comparison of Normal Step and Consecutive Lists
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subsystemsfrom thesamestages. Theobjectof this experimentwasto test the effect
of this reductionin the mutualdependence.
Figure22showsthecurveswhich indicatetheeffectachievedby progressively
distributingthe spares. Therelatively minor gainswhichare madeby this simple
modificationare significant, however,becausetheycanbeachievedwithout h_creasing
theamountof peripheral circuitry, regardlessof thetypecircuitry whichis used.
d. Experiment IV. All of the strategies considered in the first three experiments have
restricted spare subsystems to making only one of its possible moves. Thus, if a sub-
system moved to a new location and made a repair, every spare list on which that sub-
system originally appeared was effectively shortened by one entry. The set of strategies
which were tested in this experiment employed spare lists which were identical to those
of the consecutive and distributed step list used previously. The only difference was that
subsystems were allowed to move to the aid of vulnerable stages without regard to
whether they had moved previously. The object of this experiment was to determine if
this "multiple-move" capability would be significant in improving system reliability.
Figure 23 shows the results of the simulation graphically. Again, one of the con-
secutive list curves developed in the earlier experiments is included in figure 23 to
provide a reference for the degree of improvement. It can be seen from this figure that
a slight improvement is obtained through the addition of the multiple-move capability,
but it is not nearly as pronounced as some of the other effects have been.
This same experiment was conducted using the progressively distributed step list.
In this case, the curves were precisely the same for systems having less than four spares
on spare lists of the individual stages. For systems having four or more spares, the
curves were so nearly the same that the difference could not be observed from plots made
to the same scale as the rest of the curves presented in this paper. In retrospect, this
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result could have been at least partially anticipated because the subsystems in systems
having less than four spares per stage have only one movement possibility; therefore,
multiple moves are inherently impossible. For systems having four or more spares per
stage, the chance of requiring multiple moves is apparently very low.
e. Experiment V. Each of the first four experiments was designed to test the effect of
some particular characteristic of systems using well-ordered response strategies. The
response strategies which were simulated in this experiment do not belong to this well-
ordered class. The spare lists for this set of strategies were, in fact, completely random.
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Random patterns for each stage were generated by forming the spare lists from a
set of randomly selected identification numbers. With the exception of those subsystems
originally located in the stage for which the spare list was being generated, all of the I. D.
numbers in the system were available each time a selection was made.
The primary object of the experiment was to test the relative effectiveness of the
well-ordered strategies by determining the reliability of a system using different randomly
selected spare lists for each stage. Figure 24 shows the results obtained from this ex-
periment. It can be seen from the comparison of curve (1) with curve (2) in figure 24,
that the random strategy is certainly not as bad as might be suspected. This is true be-
cause the mutual dependence of any two stages on spares from any other stage is relative-
ly low, and the spare capability is spread among all the subsystems in the system. As
it was shown in Experiment HI, these two factors are very effective in improving system
reliability. Furthermore, it should be noted that the results shownin figure 24 correspond
to a random system which was found to be the best of several such systems tested.
As a matter of interest to the investigator, anomer seL o_. laa_dc, m ctr__Leg!e_ w_s
simulated. This set was permitted to have a different spare list for each individual sub-
system. The only restriction which was imposed was that no subsystem spare list could
include the identification numbers of subsystems located in the same stage as the subsys-
tem for which the list was being prepared.
The object of this portion of the experiment was to determine if systems using in-
dividual subsystem spare lists were potentially more reliable than those which are
restricted to one list per stage. Figure 25 shows the results of the simulation. Although
the results shown here do indicate that such systems offer a slight advantage in the lower
region of the curve, the investigator judged the implementation problems of this type
response strategy to be too formidable to merit further study at this time.
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2. Order-Four Systems (Experiment VI)
Higher order redundant systems may be used to reach either of two objectives.
One of these objectives is the achievement of longer system life through the provision of
additional failure absorption capability. The second is achievement of a high degree of
instantaneous failure masking capability. There is a relationship between these two ob-
jectives which inherently results in the partial realization of both effects whenever one
is sought. There is, however, a definite difference between the system structure re-
quired to maximLze either effect. In the long life case, the systems are organized so
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that no repairs are effected until a stage has experienced a subsystem failure which
causes an unresolvable ambiguity to exist in that stage. This is the same switching
criteria used for the order-three systems. In the high failure masking case, repairs are
performed whenever a subsystem failure results in less than order-three redundancy
being maintained at any stage. It should be noted that the assumption has been made in
both cases that any subsystem may move only one time, i.e., may make only one repair.
Based on the preceding test results, only the progressively distributed step list
response strategy was considered. The simulation tests for the order four systems were
used to determine the relative potential difference between systems subject to different
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failure masking restraints. Figure 26 shows the results of the test. As might be expect:
ed, the early use of spares to provide instantaneous failure masking capability precludes
their later use for greatly extending the life of a system after it has experienced a
relatively large number of failures.
3. Fractional Order Systems
a. Experiment VII. The serious consideration of less than order three redundancy for
systems using the multiple-line configuration is virtually impossible. Certainly no con-
sideration would be given to making any stages second order because these stages would
be twice as vulnerable to failure as their non-redundant counterparts. Systems of this
type are, however, quite practicable when the systems have some failure responsive
capability.
Figure 27 shows two, "two-and-one-half" order system. As the figure illustrates,
these systems have third-order redundancy at half their stages and second order at the
other half. The use of fractional order system introduces some interesting new problems.
For example, if consecutive lists are to be considered, the problem of where to put the
"empty spots" in the system immediately arises. Figures 27a and 27b illustrate the two
must divergent possibilities. Figure 27a schematically shows a system having the "empty
spots" in the row from which spares are taken. Figure 27b shows a similar system hav-
ing the "empty spots" in a different row. Figure 28 shows the curves which compare
these two possibilities and the progressively distributed step list. The most significant
item to be found in figure 28 is the potential improvement in useful system life over the
order-three multiple-line configuration by failure responsive systems having less than
order-three redundancy.
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b. Experiment VIII. In the same manner that systems canbe designedusingtwo-and-one-
half-order redundancy, they can be designed using three and one half order redundancy.
The primary reaons for employing this greater order of redundancy are identical to those
associated with the order-four systems, i. e., longer life or higher instantaneous failure
masking capability. As in the case of the order-four systems, the achievement of high
instantaneous failure masking results in a shorter overall "useful" life. It is important
to note, however, that even under the high degree of failure masking restraint, these
systems have potentially much longer lives than either order three systems or fixed re-
dundant (i.e.,no spares)order-three-and-one-ha_ systems. Figure 29 shows the curves
illustrating all of these effects.
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B. PhaseII Simulations
In all of theexperimentswhichwere conducteduring Phase I of this study, the
assumption was made that failures could not occur in the peripheral switching circuitry
required to implement the response strategies. For the experiments of Phase II, this
-___,.,,_*'^-_Lul, has been dropped and a much less restrictive, more realistic set of three
assumptions has been substituted. These assumptions may be stated as follows:
1. All the peripheral error detection switching circuitry may be divided into
sections which can be uniquely associated with a single subsystem.
2. The failure of a detection and switching circuit will have the same effect as the
failure of the associated subsystem.
3. The error detection and switching circuitry associated with any particular
subsystem may be subdivided into a fixed portion (FSC) and a variable portion
(VSC). The fixed portion represents the minimum amount of circuitry required
by the subsystem to operate in its original location. The variable portion is
the amount of added circuitry required by the subsystem to move to each new
location.
The relative failure rates of the subsystems, the FSC and the VSC are represented
in the following discussion and figures by the designations:
Subsystem Failure Rate
FSC Failure Rate
VSC Failure Rate
: × ss (12)
: k FSC (13)
: h VSC (14)
In this study, only the relative failure rates were of interest; therefore, these rates are
expressed in "units", rather than in parts per hour or any other specific units.
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failure rates of individual subsystems is given below.
assumptions are made:
An example of how these relative failure rates are used to compute the total relative
For this example, the following
1. The relative failure rates are:
k
SS = 1.0 Units (15)
k FSC = 0.2 Units (16)
k VSC = 0.5 Units (17)
2. An order-three redundancy system with four spares per stage and a progressive-
ly distributed step list is being considered. (This assumption means that t_-o
thirds of the subsystems in the system will have the capability to move to one
new location and the remaining third can move to two locations. )
The total relative failure rate of the subsystems which can move to one new loca-
tion is:
k
SS = 1.0 (18)
k FSC = 0.2 ,lo_
k VSC = 0.5 (20)
k
TOT = 1.7 Units (21)
The total relative failure rate of the subsystems which can move to two new loca-
tions is:
k VSC
k SS = 1.0 (22)
k FSC = 0.2 (23)
= 2x0.5 = 1.0 (24)
TOT = 2.2 Units (25)
These total failure rates may be interpreted to mean that the switching circuitry associ-
ated with a particular subsystem is approximately 0.70 or 1.20 times as "complex" as the
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subsystem,respectively. Theresults of theexperimentsconductedduringPhaseI of
this programindicatethat theprogressivelydistributedsteplist responsestrategy is
generallythemost effectiveof thestrategiesconsidered. For this reason, theexperi-
mentsof PhaseII havebeenlimited to systemsusingtheprogressivelydistributedstep
list responsestrategy.
Theobjectiveof theseexperimentswasto showthat the additionof failure respon-
sive capabilitywouldbehighlybeneficial to redundantsystemlife evenif the error
detectionandswitchingcircuitry were relatively unreliable. To accomplishthis, the
relative failure ratesusedin theaboveexamplewereappliedto theorder twoandone
half, order three, order threeandonehalf andorder four systems. Figures 30, 31, 32,
and33showtheseresults.
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Figure 30. Order-Two-and-One-Half Progressively Distributed Step List
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Figure 31. Order-Three Progressively Distributed Step List
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Figure 32. Order-Three-and-One-Half Progressively Distributed Step List
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Figure 33. Order-Four Progressively Distributed Step List
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' IX. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. Summary
The primary objective of this study has been the development of a new technique for
more effectively employing redundant equipment to increase the useful life of electronic
digital systems. Such a technique has been devised for the class of digital systems having
a high degree of homogeneity among the subsystems within each system. This thesis
describes the work by the author in developing this technique and in evaluating its effect
upon the reliabilityof this particular class of digitalsystems.
The sections of this thesis can be divided into three groups. The first group indi-
cates the need for highly reliable systems and describes a few of the techniques which
have been developed for achieving high reliability. This group includes a description of
the failure responsive systems whose characteristics are of primary interest in this
investigation.
The material presented in the second group describes several techniques which were
considered in attempts to develop mathematical expressions for the reliabilityof failure
responsive systems. The failure of the techniques to describe adequately these systems
resulted in the formation of a computer simulation program. The details of this program
are presented in Section VI. The final portion of this group describes the measure of
effectiveness which was established as a means for comparing the different organizational
strategies discussed in the thesis.
The last group contains a description of the results which have been obtained from
the simulation program, The curves presented in Section VIII represent the combined
results of thousands of simulated system failures. The conclusions which can be reached
from observing the curves of Section VIII are listed in this final section.
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B. Conclusions
The curves (figures 30, 31, 32, and 33) presented in Section VIII of this thesis
show that the progressively distributed step list response strategies are the most efficient
of all the well-ordered strategies which were tested. The observance of this character-
istic and the recognition of the value of "rescan" capability leads to the following general
conclusions:
1. The capability of individual subsystems to move to new locations should be as
evenly distributed among the subsystems as possible.
2. The subsystems which are available for use as spare (or replacements) to any
two stages should be chosen so that the mutual dependence by these stages on
the same spares is minimized.
3. The systems should be so organized that, in normal circumstances, a subsys-
tem will not move to the aid of a critically failed stage if its movement will
leave the stage in which it is presently operating vulnerable to a single failure.
A critically failed stage should have the "authority", however, to demand the
movement of a spare subsystem if the movement of all of the spare subsystems
available to this stage are restricted as above.
It can also be concluded that order-two-and-one-half redundant failure responsive
systems may effectively replace order three redundant multiple-line systems in applica-
tions where instantaneous failure masking is not important. Conversely, applications
with either high instantaneous failure masking or exceptionally long life requirements
may be benefitted by employing order-three-and-one-half or order-four redundant failure
responsive systems to replace order-three, or even order-five, multiple-line systems.
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From figures 30, 31, 32, and33presentedin SectionVIII, it maybeconcludedthat
thebeneficialeffectsobtainedfrom failure responsivecapabilitymore thanoffsetsthe
disadvantagesinherentin therelatively complicatedcircuitry requiredfor systemimple-
mentation. Thesecurvesshowthattheusefullives of theexamplesystemshavebeen
significantlyincreasedover thoseof thecorrespondingexamplesof multiple-line systems.
Theseincreaseshavebeenrealizeddespiterelatively pessimisticassumptionsregarding
the reliability of the error detectionandswitchingcircuitry.
Fina!!y_ it maybeconcludedthat theoptimumnumberof sparesubsystemswhich
shouldbemadeavailableto anystageis a functionof the failure rate of theperipheral
circuitry relative to thefailure rate of thesubsystems. It canbe seenfrom thecurves
in figures 30 through33that for systemshavingrelatively simple subsystemstheoptimum
numberof availablesparesubsystemsper stagewill bearoundthree to five.
Basedonall of theabove,the generalconclusionmaybedrawnthat failure respon-
sive systemsdoemployredundantequipmentmoreeffectivelythanthefixed redundnat
systemspreviouslydeveloped. Therequirementof homogeneoussub_ystem_llmit__tbo
usefulnessof thefailure responsivetechnique,however,becauseonly a relatively small
class of digital systemshasthis homogeneouscharacteristic.
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APPENDIX
The assumption has been made in this thesis that individual subsystems fail at ran-
dom times but at some constant rate, lamda (k). The fact that the rate is independent
of time implies that the probability of failure (13) of any one subsystem in tony interval
Atis
Pr (failure) : ),A t (26)
if the interval is sufficiently small. If a subsystem failure is known to have occurred in
some interval A t about the time t, and one is interested in the conditional probability
that the failure occurred in one of a set of identical subsystems, the following relationship
can be seen to exist:
P (failure of the ith subsystem/one subsystem has failed)
At
: k i (27)
Xi At
All i
ki At ki At ki (28)but = =
At E Xi
All i i All iAll i
therefore, P (i/l) _ k i (29)
E ki
All i
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